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Abstract
We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed
receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the re-
ceiver’s decision-making and signal the sender’s information. Although full separation
can always be supported in equilibrium, partial or complete pooling is optimal if the re-
ceiver’s decision-making is highly responsive to information. In this case, the receiver’s
decision-making is disciplined by pooling extreme states, where she is most tempted to
defect. In characterizing optimal equilibria, we establish new results on monotone per-
suasion.
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1 Introduction
Decision-makers and informed parties often develop relationships in which communication
and decision-making are governed by informal agreements. We study how such interactions
can be disciplined using relational contracts: discretionary compensation schemes that are
self-enforcing in a repeated game. We characterize communication and decision-making
patterns in optimal equilibria.
As an example of such relational communication, consider the interaction between lob-
byists and politicians. Lobbyists seek to influence politicians’ policy decisions.1 They pro-
vide politicians with information about the electoral and economic consequences of vari-
ous policy choices, such as voter attitudes toward a proposed carbon tax, or the impact of
cigarette smoking on health outcomes. Lobbyists also make transfers to politicians, in the
form of political contributions. Such transfers serve as contingent contributions for favor-
able policy decisions (Grossman and Helpman 1994, 1996) and credible signals of lobbyists’
information (Austen-Smith 1995 and Lohmann 1995). While political contributions are legal
in many countries, explicit payments for policy decisions usually constitute illegal bribery
and political corruption. Consequently, agreements between politicians and lobbyists are
largely implicit and supported by trust and reputation. Indeed, lobbyists often maintain
long-standing relationships with politicians.
Another example of relational communication is decision-making within and across or-
ganizations, which are often governed by informal agreements — “firms are riddled with
relational contracts” (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 2002). Consider an agent who imple-
ments various projects such as the development of a potential new product, and a principal
who has relevant information about each project such as consumer demand for that product.
The agent and principal may correspond to a subordinate and superior within an organiza-
tion, or to an upstream producer and downstream retailer in a supply chain. The principal
may advise or even instruct the agent, but it is the agent who decides how to implement the
project.2 Besides giving advice, the principal often pays the agent to influence implementa-
tion. Payments may take the form of bonuses, cash advances, gifts, and raises. Payments
may directly reward the agent for compliant implementation. Payments may also give cred-
ibility to the principal’s advice — “the leader offers gifts to the followers ... because the
leader’s sacrifice convinces them that she must truly consider this to be a worthwhile activ-
ity” (Hermalin 1998).
Our analysis of relational communication is based on an infinitely-repeated communi-
1See Grossman and Helpman (2001) and Persson and Tabellini (2002) for reviews.
2Similar to us, Landier, Sraer and Thesmar (2009) and Van den Steen (2010) consider situations with a
subordinate as a decision-maker implementing a project and a superior as an informed party giving advice.
See Section 3.4 of Gibbons, Matouschek and Roberts (2013) for a review.
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cation game, played by a sender and a receiver who can make voluntary transfers to each
other at any point in the game. In each period, the sender privately observes an indepen-
dent draw of the state and sends a message to the receiver, who then makes a decision. The
players’ preferred decisions are increasing in the state, but the magnitude and sign of the
difference between preferred decisions may depend on the state.3
In relational communication, transfers allow the sender not only to reward the receiver
for compliant decision-making, but also to credibly signal his private information. In partic-
ular, full separation can be supported in equilibrium, even when the players are impatient.
Therefore, the essential incentive constraint is that the receiver is tempted to make decisions
that benefit herself but hurt the sender.
We show that a message rule can be supported in equilibrium if and only if it is monotone:
it induces a monotone partition of the set of states. In any (Pareto) optimal equilibrium, the
decision rule simply maximizes, subject to the receiver’s incentive constraint, the joint payoff
for each message. Therefore, given this decision rule, the optimal message rule solves the
monotone persuasion problem: it maximizes the expected joint payoff over all monotone
message rules. We establish new results on optimal monotone persuasion and discuss how
the monotonicity constraint affects the optimal message rule.
We completely characterize the optimal (second-best) equilibrium when the players’ pay-
offs are quadratic. Our key insights are about how information should be selectively hidden
and revealed to manage decision-making in optimal relationships. Consider extreme states
where conflict of interest is so large that the first-best decision is not self enforcing. At these
states, self enforcement requires that second-best decision-making be distorted in favor of
the receiver. If the sender’s and receiver’s preferred decisions respond similarly to informa-
tion, then first-best and second-best decision-making also respond similarly to information,
so full separation is optimal. In contrast, if the receiver is highly responsive to information
relative to the sender, then second-best decision-making is too responsive to information, so
extreme states are optimally pooled to moderate second-best decision-making.
Pooling does not only occur at extreme states. Suppose the players are neither too pa-
tient nor too impatient, so that extreme and non-extreme states coexist. Then over-pooling
occurs: extreme states are optimally pooled with some adjacent non-extreme states to fur-
ther ease self enforcement at those extreme states. In other words, optimal relationships hide
information about some states where full separation and first-best decision-making could be
supported in equilibrium.
The result that the sender reveals (hides) information when conflict of interest is mod-
3We also argue that the main insights from our analysis apply in more general settings. Specifically, in Sec-
tion 7, we discuss the following extensions: exogenous outside options for the players; imperfect monitoring
of the receiver’s decision; and correlation of states across time.
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erate (extreme) seems to be a natural pattern of communication in relationships. Lobby-
ists often discuss in detail the costs and benefits of potential legislation with politicians,
but may hide their private information in cases that are particularly controversial or con-
sequential. For example, the tobacco lobby concealed and distorted evidence from internal
studies that cigarettes caused lung cancer (Hilts 1994 and Harris 2008), to soften regulation
of tobacco products by Congress. In organizations, superiors provide honest advice and
subordinates comply when their preferences are largely aligned, but superiors may hide
information when subordinates are most tempted to dissent or disobey.
We also show that relational communication becomes more informative as the discount
factor increases. As the players become more patient, second-best decision-making more
closely approximates first-best decision-making and thus makes better use of information.
Consequently, the sender optimally reveals more information to the receiver.
An implication of our analysis is that in settings where voluntary transfers are available,
incomplete information transmission does not imply a failure to motivate communication,
but instead is a tool to discipline decision-making. In other words, the Pareto frontier cannot
be expanded simply by introducing a technology for credible (monotone) communication.4
This point provides a rationale for the separation of information and control in organiza-
tions. Indeed, we show that increasing organizational transparency and delegating the deci-
sion right to an informed player generally decreases the efficiency of informal relationships.
1.1 Related Literature
Our analysis builds on an extensive literature on repeated interactions with transfers. The
seminal papers by Bull (1987) and Macleod and Malcomson (1989) focus on settings with
symmetric information. Levin (2003) characterizes the optimal relational contract in two
important settings with asymmetric information: adverse selection and moral hazard. In
these settings, only the decision-maker (agent) has private information, so there is no role for
information transmission between the principal and agent. In contrast, our setting involves
an informed sender and an uninformed decision-maker (receiver), in the vein of Crawford
and Sobel (1982). In such relational communication, pooling serves to affect the receiver’s
beliefs and thus directly influences her decision-making. In contrast, the decision-maker
(agent) in Levin (2003) is fully informed, so pooling has no such effect.
Alonso and Matouschek (2007) also consider repeated communication. In contrast to
us, they disallow transfers and consider a sequence of short-lived senders rather than a
4This is in contrast with the existing literature on cheap talk and delegation, where the receiver’s expected
payoff (which is the standard welfare criterion) unambiguously improves if credible communication can be
costlessly achieved.
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single long-lived sender.5 In their setting, repeated interaction disciplines decision-making,
in order to sustain more informative communication. In contrast, in our setting, credible
communication is easy to achieve; so repeated interaction improves decision-making which
in turn determines the informativeness of optimal communication.
In our model, transfers from the sender to the receiver are used to signal information.6
Austen-Smith and Banks (2000) and Kartik (2007) consider a related (albeit static) setting
where the sender burns money to signal information.7 Unlike burning money, signaling
information with transfers incurs no welfare cost. This leads to a clean characterization
of the set of optimal equilibria; in particular, all optimal equilibria in our model produce
identical communication outcomes.8 As a byproduct, we establish a general characterization
of equilibria in games of cheap talk with burned money: a message rule is implementable if
and only if it is monotone.
In our model, optimal equilibria are supported by carrot-and-stick strategies (Abreu 1986
and Goldlücke and Kranz 2012), in which a deviator is punished as harshly as possible but
only for a single period. We show that the receiver is punished by complete pooling of
information and the sender is punished by an extreme incentive compatible decision. These
punishments also characterize the receiver’s and sender’s worst equilibria in games of cheap
talk with burned money.
We establish equivalence between optimal relational communication and monotone per-
suasion.9,10 In a Bayesian persuasion problem (Rayo and Segal 2010 and Kamenica and
Gentzkow 2011), the sender can commit ex ante to an unconstrained message rule. A mono-
tone persuasion problem is a Bayesian persuasion problem with a constraint that message
rules are monotone. Dworczak and Martini (2019) derive conditions under which a mono-
5Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2011) consider a model of repeated decision-making with transfers between
long-lived players, but assume symmetric information, so communication plays no role.
6Ottaviani (2000), Krishna and Morgan (2008), and Ambrus and Egorov (2017) consider communication
games where contractible transfers from the receiver to the sender are used to elicit the sender’s information,
as in mechanism design. In contrast, the sender uses voluntary transfers to signal information in our setting; so
pooling is optimal because it moderates the receiver’s decision-making, not because it is costly for the receiver
to elicit information.
7Kartik, Ottaviani and Squintani (2007) and Kartik (2009) consider related models with lying costs instead
of money burning.
8In the setting with burned money, equilibrium communication outcomes differ along the Pareto frontier
because there is a tradeoff between the informativeness of communication and the costs of burning money.
The receiver’s optimal equilibrium clearly involves full separation; Karamychev and Visser (2017) characterize
the sender’s optimal equilibrium.
9A model of repeated (monotone) persuasion would reproduce many of the insights from our model of
relational communication. There is a literature on dynamic Bayesian persuasion, albeit with persistent infor-
mation (Kremer, Mansour and Perry 2014, Au 2015, Ely, Frankel and Kamenica 2015, Hörner and Skrzypacz
2016, Ely 2017, Che and Horner 2018, Ely and Szydlowski 2019, Orlov, Skrzypacz and Zryumov 2019, Best and
Quigley 2017, and Smolin 2018).
10Relatedly, Kolotilin and Zapechelnyuk (2019) establish equivalence between optimal delegation and
monotone persuasion.
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tone message rule is optimal among all unconstrained message rules. In contrast, we ex-
plicitly characterize the optimal monotone message rule when it differs from the optimal
unconstrained message rule. In line with the literature on Bayesian persuasion (Gentzkow
and Kamenica 2016, Kolotilin et al. 2017, Kolotilin 2018, Dworczak and Martini 2019), we
consider the case where marginal payoffs are linear in the state.
Our paper also contributes to the rapidly growing literature on Bayesian persuasion with
transferable utility (Bergemann and Pesendorfer 2007, Eso˝ and Szentes 2007, Li and Shi 2017,
Bergemann, Bonatti and Smolin 2018, and Dworczak 2017). Similarly to these papers, we use
tools from mechanism design and Bayesian persuasion. Unlike these papers, commitment
power in our model is endogenous and thus imperfect.
2 Model
2.1 Setup
A sender (S) and a receiver (R) play an infinitely repeated communication game with perfect
monitoring and with voluntary transfers. Time is discrete and the players have a common
discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1). In each period, the same stage game is played. The sender pri-
vately observes a state θ ∈ [0, 1] and sends a message m ⊂ [0, 1] to the receiver, who then
makes a decision d ∈ R. The state θ is independently drawn each period from a prior dis-
tribution F(θ) with a strictly positive density f (θ) for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. The sender’s payoff
uS (d, θ), the receiver’s payoff uR (d, θ), and the joint payoff u(d, θ) = uS(d, θ) + uR(d, θ)
satisfy Crawford and Sobel (1982)’s assumptions:
Assumption 1.
1. uS(d, θ) and uR(d, θ) are twice differentiable in d and θ for all d ∈ R and θ ∈ [0, 1],
2. ∂
2uS
∂d2 (d, θ) ≤ 0 and ∂
2uR
∂d2 (d, θ) < 0 for all d ∈ R and θ ∈ [0, 1],
3. ∂uR∂d (ρR(θ), θ) = 0 and
∂u
∂d (ρFB(θ), θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ [0, 1] and some functions ρR and ρFB,
4. ∂
2uS
∂d∂θ (d, θ) > 0 and
∂2uR
∂d∂θ (d, θ) > 0 for all d ∈ R and θ ∈ [0, 1].
Part 2 of Assumption 1 requires that the sender’s and receiver’s payoffs be respectively
weakly and strictly concave in the decision. Part 3 requires that there be a unique receiver’s
preferred decision ρR(θ) and a unique first-best decision ρFB(θ) for each state θ ∈ [0, 1].
Note that parts 2 and 3 are weaker than in Crawford and Sobel (1982), where the sender
and receiver have strictly concave payoffs and unique preferred decisions ρS(θ) and ρR(θ).
5
sender makes
ex-ante transfer
sender privately
observes state θ 
receiver makes
ex-ante transfer
sender makes
interim transfer
receiver makes
interim transfer
sender makes
ex-post transfer
receiver makes
ex-post transfer
sender sends
message m 
receiver chooses
decision d 
Figure 1: Timing of stage game
Part 4 is a sorting condition that ensures that ρS(θ) (if it exists), ρR(θ), and ρFB(θ) are strictly
increasing in θ.
The players can make voluntary (non-contractible) transfers at any point in the game.
Specifically, we enrich the stage game with three rounds of transfers: (i) an ex-ante round
before the sender observes the state, (ii) an interim round after the sender observes the state
and sends the message but before the receiver chooses a decision, and (iii) an ex-post round
after the decision is chosen. In each round, transfers are made sequentially, first by the
sender and then by the receiver. Each player chooses a non-negative gross transfer to the
other player and a non-negative amount of money to burn. The players’ transfer choices in
each round determine their net transfers in that round. Specifically, the sender’s net transfer
equals his gross transfer, minus the receiver’s gross transfer, plus the sender’s money burned
(and similarly for the receiver). The net transfers by player i ∈ {S, R} in the ex-ante, interim,
and ex-post rounds are denoted by τi, ti, and Ti; so the stage game payoff of player i is
ui (d, θ)− τi − ti − Ti. Note that net transfers in each round must satisfy τS + τR ≥ 0, tS +
tR ≥ 0, and TS + TR ≥ 0, with strict inequality in the case of burned money.11 Although
we allow for both ex-ante and ex-post transfers, ex-ante transfers can substitute for ex-post
transfers (and vice versa).12
The game has perfect monitoring in that all actions (message, decision, and transfers) are
immediately publicly observed, but the state is only observed by the sender. That is, the
receiver never observes the state or her payoff.13 Figure 1 summarizes the timing of each
stage game.
11Conversely, for any net transfers that satisfy these three constraints, we can construct gross transfers and
burned money amounts that correspond to these net transfers.
12Thus we may, for example, restrict attention to equilibria where the ex-ante transfers (τS, τR) are zero in
every period except the first period. In this case, we may think of the first-period ex-ante transfers as ‘up-front’
payments that determine the division of surplus in the relationship.
13This assumption is common in the literature on repeated games with incomplete information (Aumann,
Maschler and Stearns 1995), and is ubiquitous in models of repeated communication (Renault, Solan and Vieille
2013, Frankel 2016, Margaria and Smolin 2018, and Lipnowski and Ramos 2018).
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We study pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria. For each period and each history, an
equilibrium specifies a message rule µ(θ) for the sender, a decision rule ρ(m) for the receiver,
and transfer rules τi, ti(m), Ti(m) for each player i ∈ {S, R}.14
Conventions. A (pure-strategy) message rule deterministically maps states to the mes-
sages they induce. Without loss of generality, we identify each message with the set of states
that induce this message, m = {θ : µ(θ) = m}. Thus, the range µ([0, 1]) of a message rule
µ is a partition of the set of states. A message rule µ is monotone if each m ∈ µ([0, 1]) is a
convex set (either a singleton or an interval).
We can now extend the definition of payoffs and preferred decisions from being state de-
pendent to being message dependent. Specifically, ui(d, m) = EF[ui(d, θ)|m] for each player
i ∈ {S, R}, u(d, m) = uS(d, m) + uR(d, m), ρR(m) = arg maxd∈R uR(d, m), and ρFB(m) =
arg maxd∈R u(d, m). Assumption 1 ensures that ρR(m) and ρFB(m) are well defined and are
strictly increasing in m in the strong set order.
2.2 Stationarity
We focus on stationary equilibria. An equilibrium is stationary if on the equilibrium path,
the message rule µ, the decision rule ρ, and the transfer rules τi, ti, and Ti for i ∈ {S, R} are
identical in every period. An equilibrium is optimal if it is not Pareto dominated by any other
equilibrium. An equilibrium is sequentially optimal if the continuation equilibrium following
any history on the equilibrium path is optimal.
Lemma 1. There exist vS, vR, and v such that the set of equilibrium payoffs V ⊂ R2 is a simplex of
the form
V = {(vS, vR) : vS ≥ vS, vR ≥ vR, vS + vR ≤ v} .
Any optimal equilibrium is sequentially optimal and involves no burned money. Further, there exists
a stationary optimal equilibrium σ∗ such that any (vS, vR) ∈ V can be supported by an equilibrium
that differs from σ∗ only in the first-period ex-ante transfers.
Lemma 1 extends some of Levin (2003)’s and Goldlücke and Kranz (2012)’s results to
our setting, with an extensive-form stage game of incomplete information. Because players’
payoffs are quasi-linear in money, payoffs are fully transferable, and contingent transfers
can substitute for contingent continuation payoffs. Consequently, we can restrict attention
to stationary equilibria, and all optimal equilibria induce the message and decision rules
that maximize joint payoff v = vS + vR. Further, due to free disposal (both players can burn
money), the set of equilibrium payoffs is a simplex.
14The functions µ, ρ, ti, and Ti are required to be measurable.
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Optimal equilibria do not involve burned money, because burning money would only
tighten incentive constraints and reduce the joint payoff. Therefore, the Pareto frontier
would not change if we modified the model by disallowing money burning.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Implementability
We now show that the presence of interim and ex post voluntary transfers enables separa-
tion of the sender’s and receiver’s incentive constraints. The sender’s incentive constraint
requires that the decision outcome be monotone. The receiver’s incentive constraint requires
that induced decisions be close to the receiver’s preferred decisions.
Define the receiver’s temptation to deviate from decision d given message m as
wR(d, m) = uR(ρR(m), m)− uR(d, m),
and the (net) discounted surplus given joint payoff v as
L(v) =
δ
1− δ (v− vS − vR).
Proposition 1. A message rule µ and a decision rule ρ that produce a joint payoff v can be supported
in a stationary equilibrium if and only if
ρ(µ(θ)) is nondecreasing in θ, (1)
wR(ρ(m), m) ≤ L(v) for all m ∈ µ([0, 1]). (2)
We first argue that (1) and (2) are necessary. In any equilibrium, the message rule µ(θ)
must be incentive compatible for the sender. Since the sender’s payoff is quasi-linear in
money and satisfies a sorting condition, a standard characterization of incentive compat-
ibility in mechanism design (see, for example, Rochet 1987) implies that ρ(µ(θ)) must be
nondecreasing in θ.
Also, in any equilibrium, the decision rule ρ must be incentive compatible for the re-
ceiver. Therefore, given a message m, the receiver’s one-period payoff gain from choosing
her preferred decision ρR(m) instead of equilibrium decision ρ(m) must be less than the
maximum available punishment equal to the discounted surplus.
We now argue that (1) and (2) are sufficient. Ignoring the sender’s incentive compatibility
constraint, any decision rule ρ that satisfies (2) can be made incentive compatible for the
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receiver by giving all surplus to the receiver (vR = v − vS) and threatening her with her
worst equilibrium payoff (vR = vR) following any deviation from ρ(m).
In such a construction, the sender receives his worst equilibrium payoff vS and thus
cannot be punished for deviating. But for any message rule µ that satisfies (1), we can sepa-
rately construct a (voluntary) interim transfer rule that makes µ incentive compatible for the
sender.
The revenue equivalence theorem (see, for example, Milgrom and Segal 2002) implies
that there exists a unique (up to a constant C) interim transfer rule tS such that the sender
prefers to induce ρ(µ(θ)) and pay tS(µ(θ)) rather than to induce ρ(µ(θˆ)) and pay tS(µ(θˆ))
for all θˆ 6= θ,
tS(m) = uS(ρ(m), θ(m))−
ˆ θ(m)
0
∂uS
∂θ
(ρ(µ(θ˜)), θ˜)dθ˜ + C, (3)
where θ(m) is an arbitrary state θ ∈ m.15 The constant C can be chosen in such a way that
the sender does not want to deviate to any out-of-equilibrium message-transfer pair (mˆ, tˆS).
Specifically, choose C such that the minimum transfer is equal to zero and is achieved for
some punishment message mp,16
tS(m) ≥ 0 for all m ∈ µ([0, 1]), with equality for some mp ∈ µ([0, 1]). (4)
If following any out-of-equilibrium pair (mˆ, tˆS), the receiver believes that the state is in mp
and chooses the punishment decision dp = ρ(mp), then the sender prefers to report mp and
pay tS(mp) = 0 rather than to report mˆ and pay tˆS. Thus, the sender’s incentive compatibility
constraint is satisfied.
This argument implies that voluntary interim transfers are powerful in signaling infor-
mation, even if the players are myopic.17
Corollary 1. Suppose δ = 0. A message rule µ and a decision rule ρ can be supported in an
equilibrium if and only if µ is monotone and ρ(m) = ρR(m) for all m ∈ µ([0, 1]).
Corollary 1 is closely connected to existing results from the literature on cheap talk and
burned money (Austen-Smith and Banks 2000, Kartik 2007, and Karamychev and Visser
2017). In the myopic setting, interim transfers serve the same signaling role as burned
money. In fact, the set of implementable message and decision rules does not depend on
15Since ρ(µ(θ)) is nondecreasing in θ, tS(m) is independent of the choice of a representative state θ ∈ m.
16In the proof, we allow for the possibility that inf tS(m) is not attained by any mp.
17Although interim transfers are powerful, messages are still used to convey information. For example, sup-
pose the players’ preferred decision rules intersect at some state. Then in any fully separating equilibrium, the
interim transfer function is non-monotone and takes the same value for multiple state realizations. Messages
are thus used to distinguish between these realizations.
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whether the sender transfers money to the receiver (tR = −tS) or whether the sender burns
money (tR = 0).18
In contrast to burned money, interim transfers are not wasteful: the sender’s loss is the re-
ceiver’s gain. Further, since ex-ante transfers are available, the use of interim transfers does
not create a distributional imbalance. Any surplus obtained by the receiver from interim
transfers can be redistributed to the sender using ex-ante transfers. Such ex-ante transfers
can be supported by the threat of complete pooling of information. Consequently, the sender
can commit at no welfare cost to any monotone message rule.
3.2 Optimality
An optimal equilibrium solves a monotone persuasion problem: it maximizes the expected
joint payoff over monotone message rules, subject to the second-best decision rule.
Define the second-best decision given message m as
ρ∗(m) = arg max
d
u(d, m)
subject to wR(d, m) ≤ L(v),
(5)
and the joint payoff under the second-best decision as
u∗(m) = u(ρ∗(m), m) for all m ⊂ [0, 1]. (6)
Proposition 2. In an optimal equilibrium, the message rule is
µ∗ ∈ arg max
µ
E [u∗(µ(θ))]
subject to µ is monotone,
(7)
and the decision rule is ρ∗(m) for all m ∈ µ∗([0, 1]).
The intuition for Proposition 2 is as follows. By Proposition 1, an optimal equilibrium
maximizes v jointly over message and decision rules that satisfy (1) and (2). By constraint (1)
and a revelation principle argument, we can restrict attention to monotone message rules.
Consider a relaxed problem in which the constraint (1) is replaced with the constraint that
the message rule is monotone. It is easy to see that ρ∗ given by (5) and µ∗ given by (7)
18Karamychev and Visser (2017)’s Proposition 1 characterizes implementable outcomes with money burn-
ing. Our mechanism design approach to characterization provides a much simpler proof of the result and
removes the assumptions that the bias ρR − ρFB has constant sign and that the receiver’s payoff satisfies a sort-
ing condition. Indeed, if the receiver’s payoff did not satisfy part 4 of Assumption 1, our Proposition 1 and its
proof would still hold, but Corollary 1 would require that ρR(µ(θ)) be nondecreasing in θ, rather than that µ
be monotone.
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solve this relaxed problem. Further, we show that ρ∗(m) is nondecreasing in m because
the sender’s and receiver’s payoffs satisfy the sorting condition (part 4 of Assumption 1).
Therefore, ρ∗(µ∗(θ)) is nondecreasing in θ, the constraint (1) is automatically satisfied, and
ρ∗ and µ∗ constitute an optimal equilibrium.
Proposition 2 shows that the decision rule and message rule in any optimal equilibrium
can be calculated in two steps. First, the decision rule is characterized without reference to
the message rule. The decision rule is point-wise equal to the second-best decision ρ∗(m)
given by (5). For each message m, the second-best decision ρ∗(m) can be found as follows.
If d = ρFB(m) satisfies the constraint of (5), then ρ∗(m) = ρFB(m). Otherwise ρ∗(m) is such
that d = ρ∗(m) satisfies the constraint of (5) with equality. Second, given ρ∗ and thus u∗, the
message rule µ∗ solves the monotone persuasion problem (7): it maximizes the expected joint
payoff E[u∗(µ(θ))] over all monotone message rules µ.
3.3 Punishment
Optimal equilibria can be supported by single-period punishment strategy profiles in which
a deviator is punished as harshly as possible but only for a single period. The receiver is
punished by complete pooling of information and the sender is punished by the highest or
lowest incentive compatible decision.
Consider strategy profiles where the ex-post transfers are zero (TS = TR = 0) and money
is never burned (τS + τR = 0 and tS + tR = 0). Denote the sender’s ex-ante transfer τS by T
and the sender’s interim transfer rule tS by t (correspondingly, τR = −T and tR = −t).
A single-period punishment strategy profile is characterized by: normal as well as penal
ex-ante transfers, T 0 as well as T S and T R; normal as well as penal message rules, µ0 as well
as µ
S
and µ
R
; normal as well as penal decision rules, ρ
0
as well as ρ
S
and ρ
R
.
Play proceeds as follows. The ex-ante transfer is T i if player i ∈ {0, S, R} deviated last
in the previous period, where i = 0 denotes that no player deviated. The message rule,
interim transfer rule, decision rule, and punishment message are µ
j
, tj, ρj, and m
p
j if player
j ∈ {0, S, R} deviated from the ex-ante transfer in this period, where tj and mpj are defined
by (3) and (4) given µ
j
and ρ
j
. The punishment decision is dpj = ρj(m
p
j ) if the sender deviated
to some (mˆ, tˆ) /∈ (µ
j
, tj)([0, 1]) in this period.
Proposition 3. There exists an optimal equilibrium in single-period punishment strategies where
1. µ
0
= µ∗, ρ0 = ρ∗, and v = E[u∗(µ∗(θ))];
2. µ
R
= [0, 1], ρ
R
= ρR, and vR = uR(ρR([0, 1]), [0, 1]);
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3. µ
S
and ρ
S
solve
vS = min
µ,ρ,θp
{
uS(ρ(mp), θp) +E
[ˆ θ
θp
∂uS
∂θ
(ρ(µ(θ˜)), θ˜)dθ˜
]}
subject to ρ(µ(θ)) is nondecreasing in θ,
ρ(m)

= ρ−(m), if m > mp,
∈ {ρ−(m), ρ+(m)}, if m = mp,
= ρ+(m), if m < mp,
(8)
where mp = µ(θp) and [ρ−(m), ρ+(m)] = {d : wR(d, m) ≤ L(v)} for all m ∈ µ([0, 1]).
Proposition 3 specifies optimal punishments for the receiver and the sender: a deviator
is punished as harshly as possible for a single period, and then optimal play resumes. The
deviator’s worst equilibrium payoff equals his or her payoff in the punishment period. Fol-
lowing a deviation from T by the receiver, the message rule is completely uninformative and
no transfers are made. Following a deviation from T by the sender, the receiver makes either
the highest or lowest incentive compatible decision, and the message and interim transfer
rules are chosen to minimize the sender’s expected payoff.
4 Monotone Persuasion
To better understand relational communication, we solve the monotone persuasion problem
(7). For generality, we treat u∗ as a primitive rather than being given by (6). The monotone
persuasion problem is of independent interest to the Bayesian persuasion literature because
the restriction to monotone message rules captures realistic constraints. For example, a non-
monotone grading policy that sometimes assigns higher grades to worse performing stu-
dents may be infeasible because it is perceived as arbitrary and unfair. Further, students
may manipulate such a policy by strategically underperforming.
Assume, as in Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016), that u∗(m) depends on a message m only
through the induced posterior mean state E[θ|m]:19
Assumption 2. u∗(m) = u∗(E[θ|m]) for all m ⊂ [0, 1].
Therefore, without loss of generality, we identify each message m with the induced pos-
terior mean state, m = E[θ|m]. This simplifies the previous convention that identified each
message with the set of states that induce it.
19This assumption is satisfied if the marginal payoffs, ∂uS/∂d and ∂uR/∂d, are linear in the state θ. In
particular, it is satisfied in Section 5 where the payoffs are quadratic.
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To solve the monotone persuasion problem (7), it is convenient to define the pooling
set P ⊂ [0, 1] of a monotone message rule µ as the set of states that are not separated by
µ. Since the prior distribution F(θ) has a density, without loss of generality, each message
m ∈ µ([0, 1]) of a monotone message rule µ is either a singleton or an open interval. Thus,
each open pooling set uniquely determines a corresponding monotone message rule. This
pooling set is a union of some disjoint open intervals, P =
⋃
i(ξi, ζi).20 The distribution F of
states induces a distribution GP of posterior mean states given by
GP(θ) =

F(θ), if θ /∈ (ξi, ζi) for all i,
F(ξi), if θ ∈ (ξi,E[θ|(ξi, ζi)]) for some i,
F(ζi), if θ ∈ [E[θ|(ξi, ζi)], ζi) for some i,
and the expected payoff may be written as E [u∗(µ(θ))] =
´ 1
0 u∗(θ)dGP(θ). Solving the
monotone persuasion problem (7) is thus equivalent to finding the optimal pooling set P∗
that maximizes
´ 1
0 u∗(θ)dGP(θ). As in Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016) and Kolotilin et al.
(2017), define the integral of GP as
ΓP(θ) =
ˆ θ
0
GP(θ˜)dθ˜ for all θ ∈ [0, 1].
Notice that each such function ΓP uniquely determines a corresponding open set P.
Assume that u∗(θ) is continuously differentiable in θ for all θ ∈ [0, 1] and is twice contin-
uously differentiable in θ for almost all θ ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 2. The optimal pooling set is
P∗ ∈ arg max
P
ˆ 1
0
u′′∗ (θ)ΓP(θ)dθ
subject to P is an open subset of [0, 1].
(9)
As (9) suggests, the optimal pooling set P∗ should be chosen to make ΓP(θ) large at states
θ where u′′∗ (θ) is positive, and small at states where u′′∗ (θ) is negative. Separating state θ
increases ΓP(θ), so full separation is optimal (P∗ = ∅) if and only if u∗(θ) is convex in θ (see
Lemmas 4 and 5 in Appendix C). In contrast, complete pooling is optimal (P∗ = [0, 1]) if
u∗(θ) is concave in θ.
For the rest of this section, we consider functions u∗(θ)with at most two inflection points.
This property holds in Section 5 where we analyze relational communication with payoffs
20We define open sets in [0, 1] rather than in R; so [0, 1/2) ∪ (1/2, 1] is also an open subset of [0, 1].
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u*
u*(θ)
(a) P∗ = [0, θL∗ ) with θL∗ < 1
0 θL θ*L=1[θ] θ
u*
u*(θ)
(b) P∗ = [0, 1]
Figure 2: P∗ when u∗(θ) has one inflection point
that are quadratic in d and θ. It also holds in many of the relevant cases in the Bayesian
persuasion literature.
We start with the case where u∗(θ) has one inflection point (Figure 2).
Proposition 4. Suppose there exists θL ∈ (0, 1) such that
u′′∗ (θ)
< 0, if θ ∈ [0, θL),> 0, if θ ∈ (θL, 1]. (10)
If there exists θL∗ ∈ (θL, 1) such that
u∗(mL∗) + u′∗(mL∗)(θL∗ −mL∗) = u∗(θL∗ ), (11)
where mL∗ = E[θ|[0, θL∗ )],
then P∗ = [0, θL∗ ) and mL∗ ∈ (0, θL). Else, P∗ = [0, 1] and mL∗ = E[θ] ∈ (0, θL).
If (10) holds, the optimal pooling set is an interval [0, θL∗ ). Figures 2a and 2b respectively
illustrate when incomplete pooling (θL∗ < 1) and complete pooling (θL∗ = 1) are optimal.
Complete pooling is optimal whenever the prior distribution F puts sufficient weight on
low states.
Further, if (10) holds, then the monotonicity constraint is non-binding. So, the optimal
unconstrained message rule that solves the unconstrained persuasion problem is monotone,
and is as described in Proposition 4 (and also in Proposition 3 of Kolotilin 2018).
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We next characterize P∗ when u∗(θ) has two inflection points (Figure 3).
Proposition 5. Suppose that for some θL, θH ∈ (0, 1) such that θL < θH,
u′′(θ)

< 0, if θ ∈ [0, θL),
> 0, if θ ∈ (θL, θH),
< 0, if θ ∈ (θH, 1].
(12)
1. If there exist θL∗ , θH∗ ∈ (θL, θH) such that θL∗ < θH∗ and
u∗(mL∗) + u′∗(mL∗)(θL∗ −mL∗) = u∗(θL∗ ), (13)
u∗(mH∗ ) + u′∗(mH∗ )(θH∗ −mH∗ ) = u∗(θH∗ ), (14)
where mL∗ = E[θ|[0, θL∗ )] and mH∗ = E[θ|(θH∗ , 1]],
then P∗ = [0, θL∗ ) ∪ (θH∗ , 1]. Also, mL∗ ∈ (0, θL) and mH∗ ∈ (θH, 1).
2. Else if there exists θM∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that
u∗(mL∗) + u′∗(mL∗)(θM∗ −mL∗) = u∗(mH∗ ) + u′∗(mH∗ )(θM∗ −mH∗ ), (15)
u∗(mL∗)F(θM∗ ) + u∗(mH∗ )(1− F(θM∗ )) ≥ u∗(E[θ]), (16)
where mL∗ = E[θ|[0, θM∗ )] and mH∗ = E[θ|(θM∗ , 1]],
then P∗ = [0, θM∗ ) ∪ (θM∗ , 1] for some θM∗ that satisfies (15) and (16). Also, mL∗ ∈ (0, θL) and
mH∗ ∈ (θH, 1).
3. Else, P∗ = [0, 1].
If (12) holds, the optimal pooling set takes one of three forms: (i) pooling of low states,
separation of intermediate states, and pooling of high states (Figure 3a); (ii) pooling of low
states and pooling of high states (Figures 3b and 3c); and (iii) pooling of all states (Figure
3d). Moving along Figures 3a → 3b → 3c → 3d, the prior distribution F puts increasingly
more weight on low and high states (and less weight on intermediate states).
If (13) and (14) hold (Figure 3a), or if u′∗(mL∗) ≤ u′∗(mH∗ ) and (15) and (16) hold (Figure 3b),
then the monotonicity constraint is non-binding, so that the optimal unconstrained message
rule is monotone and is as described in parts 1 and 2 of Proposition 5 (and also in Proposition
3 of Kolotilin 2018).
Otherwise (Figures 3c and 3d), the monotonicity constraint is binding. Thus existing ap-
proaches from the Bayesian persuasion literature no longer apply to the monotone persua-
sion problem, and the analysis presents new challenges. Absent the monotonicity constraint,
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Figure 3: P∗ when u∗(θ) has two inflection points
there is a continuum of distinct optimal unconstrained message rules. All of them are non-
monotone, induce two messages, and yield the expected payoff co u∗(E[θ]) where co u∗ is
the concavification of u∗.21 In contrast, the optimal monotone message rule is unique and is
as described in parts 2 and 3 of Proposition 5.
5 Quadratic Payoffs
To completely characterize optimal relational communication, we assume that the players’
payoffs are quadratic:
Assumption 3. uR(d, θ) = c((aθ + b)d − d2/2) and u(d, θ) = θd − d2/2 for all d ∈ R and
θ ∈ [0, 1], where b ∈ R, c ∈ (0, 1], a ∈ (0, 1/c).
21The concavification of u∗ is defined as co u∗(θ) = minu∈U u(θ), for θ ∈ [0, 1], where U is the set of all
concave functions u on [0, 1] such that u(θ) ≥ u∗(θ) for all θ ∈ [0, 1].
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For convenience, we explicitly define uR and u, which implies that uS(d, θ) = u(d, θ)−
uR(d, θ) = ((1− ac)θ − bc)d− (1− c)d2/2. Assumption 3 satisfies Assumption 1, so Propo-
sitions 1, 2, and 3 hold. Assumption 3 also satisfies Assumption 2, so Propositions 4 and 5
hold with u∗(m) = u(ρ∗(m), m) for all m ∈ [0, 1]. Under Assumption 3, the receiver’s pre-
ferred decision is ρR(θ) = aθ + b and the first-best decision is ρFB(θ) = θ. We now present
two examples that satisfy Assumption 3.
Agency Example. An agent (receiver) exerts privately costly effort d to produce output.
A principal (sender) has private information θ about the return to effort. The payoffs are
uS(d, θ) = (1 − a)θd and uR(d, θ) = aθd − d2/2, where a ∈ (0, 1) is the agent’s share of
output. Thus, the principal always prefers higher effort, but the agent’s preferred effort is
ρR(θ) = aθ. Assumption 3 is satisfied in this example with b = 0 and c = 1.
Lobbying Example. A lobbyist (sender) has private information θ about the consequences
of various policies d that a politician (receiver) can implement. The politician represents the
public; her preferred policy is ρR(θ). The lobbyist represents a special interest group; his
preferred policy is ρS(θ). The lobbyist’s and politician’s payoffs are quadratic-loss functions
uS(d, θ) = −λS(d− ρS(θ))2 and uR(d, θ) = −λR(d− ρR(θ))2, where λS ∈ (0, 1) and λR =
1− λS are payoff weights. Since λR < 1, the politician is susceptible to transfers from the
lobbyist and does not fully internalize the public interest. Thus, the first-best policy, which
maximizes the joint payoff, does not maximize public welfare, ρFB = λRρR + λSρS 6= ρR.
As in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)’s example, the lobbyist is skewed toward a policy
d0, so that ρS(θ) = (1 − α)ρR(θ) + αd0, where d0 ≥ 1/2 and α ∈ (0, 1). Assumption 3
is satisfied upon rescaling the state so that ρFB(θ) = θ and dropping policy-independent
terms from the payoff functions.22 Notice that the public and special interest agree, ρS(θ0) =
ρR(θ0), at the state θ0 = d0 if d0 ≤ 1.
5.1 Preliminaries
We set the stage by showing that it is optimal to pool some states whenever the players are
not patient enough to enforce the first-best outcome and the receiver’s preferred decision
rule is highly responsive to the state.
Under Assumption 3, the second-best decision (5) given message m pushes d as close
to ρFB(m) as possible, while still keeping d within distance ` from the receiver’s preferred
decision ρR(m):
22Assumption 3 is also satisfied in Crawford and Sobel (1982)’s example where the sender has a constant
bias, so that ρS(θ) = ρR(θ) + β for some β ∈ R.
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ρ∗(m) = arg max
d
u(d, m)
subject to |d− ρR(m)| ≤ ` =
√
L(v)
c
,
where we call ` the relational leeway. The second-best decision rule ρ∗ is parallel to ρR at
extreme states and coincides with ρFB at non-extreme states. Formally, a state is extreme if
the first-best decision is not enforceable at this state. The set of extreme states is thus
X = {θ : |ρFB(θ)− ρR(θ)| > `}.
If nonempty, the set X consists of one or two intervals (Figure 4).
An immediate implication of Proposition 2 is that pooling can be optimal only if there
exist extreme states (X 6= ∅). Moreover, if pooling is optimal, then each non-singleton
message m must contain such extreme states; otherwise it would be optimal to separate all
states θ ∈ m and implement the first-best decision ρFB(θ) for each θ ∈ m.
Further, Assumption 3 imposes a tight link between the set of extreme states and the
curvature of the joint payoff. It is easy to show that u∗ is convex on the set of non-extreme
states. Define the receiver to be highly responsive if ρ′R(θ) > 2ρ
′
FB(θ); equivalently, a > 2.
Then u∗ is concave on the set of extreme states if and only if the receiver is highly responsive.
The rest of Section 5 will exploit this link between X and u′′∗ (θ) by using results from
Section 4 to characterize the optimal pooling set. The following result restates the fact that
full separation is optimal if and only if the joint payoff u∗ is convex on [0, 1].
Corollary 2. The optimal pooling set P∗ is nonempty if and only if the set of extreme states X is
nonempty and the receiver is highly responsive.
To understand the benefits of pooling, consider the choice between the following two
message rules which differ only on an interval (ξ, ζ) of extreme states. One message rule
µp completely pools this interval into one message E[(ξ, ζ)], and the other µs fully separates
this interval. Both message rules induce the same expected decision on (ξ, ζ),
E[ρ∗(µp(θ))|(ξ, ζ)] = E[ρ∗(µs(θ))|(ξ, ζ)] = ρ∗(E[θ|(ξ, ζ)]).
But, decisions are less responsive to the state on (ξ, ζ) under µp than under µs:
0 = ρ′∗(µp(θ)) < ρ′∗(µs(θ)) = ρ′R(θ).
So, ρFB is closer to ρ∗(µp) than to ρ∗(µs) if ρ′FB(θ) = 1 is closer to 0 than to ρ
′
R(θ) = a. Thus,
if a > 2, pooling is optimal at extreme states.
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Figure 4: Agency and Lobbying Examples
Agency Example. Will the principal ever withhold information from the agent? Since the
agent gets a share of output but bears all the costs, her preferred effort ρR(θ) = aθ is less
responsive to θ than the first-best effort ρFB(θ) = θ. Therefore, full separation is optimal.
Further, since the agent’s temptation to under-provide effort increases with θ, extreme states
correspond to high θ (Figure 4a). At the extreme states, the second-best effort is distorted
downward.
Lobbying Example. When will the lobbyist withhold information from the politician? In-
formation is optimally pooled whenever the politician is highly responsive and extreme
states exist.23 The politician is highly responsive whenever αλS > 1/2. Intuitively, this
happens whenever the lobbyist is sufficiently skewed (α is high) and powerful (λS is high).
When the politician is highly responsive, the optimal pooling set depends on the struc-
ture of extreme states, which in turn depends on δ and θ0. If the players are myopic, all
states are extreme and complete pooling is optimal. The optimal pooling set takes more in-
teresting forms when the players are not myopic, so that not all states are extreme. In that
case, an increase in the state of agreement θ0 expands the set of extreme states by shifting
the politician’s preferred policy rule down and away from the first-best rule. Where extreme
states lie on the interval [0, 1] depends on whether the politician’s preferred policy is always
or sometimes below the lobbyist’s preferred policy (θ0 > 1 or θ0 < 1). We refer to these two
cases as constant-sign bias and changing-sign bias respectively (Figures 4b and 4c).
23In optimal equilibria, the lobbyist and politician collude, which hurts public welfare. Public welfare is
maximized in a static equilibrium where the lobbyist reveals all information and the politician implements her
preferred policy.
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5.2 Constant-Sign Bias
Suppose the receiver is highly responsive and is downwardly biased, ρR(θ) < ρFB(θ) for
all θ ∈ [0, 1].24 In this case, X consists of up to one interval that shrinks and eventually
vanishes as the players become more patient.25 Specifically, there exist δA, δB ∈ (0, 1) such
that δA > δB and
X =

∅, if δ ∈ (δA, 1),
[0, θL) for some θL ∈ (0, 1), if δ ∈ (δB, δA),
[0, 1], if δ ∈ [0, δB).
Proposition 6. Suppose the receiver is highly responsive and downwardly biased. There exists δB∗ ∈
(δB, δA) such that the optimal pooling set is
P∗ =

∅, if δ ∈ (δA, 1),
[0, θL∗ ) for some θL∗ ∈ (θL, 1), if δ ∈ (δB∗ , δA),
[0, 1], if δ ∈ [0, δB∗ ).
Further, dθL∗/dδ < 0 if δ ∈ (δB∗ , δA).
Proposition 6 highlights what we call over-pooling: all extreme states are optimally pooled
with some adjacent non-extreme states (Figure 5). The proof relies on Proposition 4, because
u∗(θ) has one inflection point at θL. To build intuition, consider the effects of marginally
expanding the pooling interval from [0, θL) to [0, θL + dθ), and thus increasing the pooling
message from mL = E[θ|[0, θL)] to mL + dm = E[θ|[0, θL + dθ)]. The cost of this expansion
is that mass f (θL)dθ of newly-added states [θL, θL + dθ) switch from the first-best decision
ρFB(θ
L) to a lower decision ρ∗(mL), resulting in a loss of (u∗(θL) − u∗(mL)) f (θL)dθ. The
benefit of this expansion is that mass F(θL) of existing states [0, θL) switch from decision
ρ∗(mL) to a higher decision ρ∗(mL + dm), resulting in a gain of u′∗(mL)dm F(θL). The net
benefit of this expansion is thus26(
u′∗(mL)(θL −mL)− (u∗(θL)− u∗(mL))
)
f (θL)dθ. (17)
If the receiver is highly responsive, then u∗ is concave on [0, θL) (Figure 2). In this case,
(17) indicates that the benefit of the marginal expansion outweighs the cost, leading to over-
pooling: the optimal threshold θL∗ is greater than θL.
24The case of an upwardly biased receiver is symmetric and omitted.
25This is because the relational leeway ` increases with δ, as shown in Lemma 7 in Appendix D.
26Here, we use the fact that dm/dθ = (θL −mL) f (θL)/F(θL) to rewrite the benefit term of (17).
20
1
θ0
d
dR(θ)
dR(θ) ± l
dFB(θ)
d*(μ*(θ))
(a) δ ∈ (δA, 1)
1
θ0
d
dR(θ)
dR(θ) ± l
dFB(θ)
d*(μ*(θ))
(b) δ ∈ (δB∗ , δA)
1
θ0
d
dR(θ)
dR(θ) ± l
dFB(θ)
d*(μ*(θ))
(c) δ ∈ (0, δB∗ )
Figure 5: Highly responsive receiver with constant-sign bias
Proposition 6 also implies that more information is optimally revealed in the sense of
Blackwell (1953) as the players become more patient. With more patient players, the second-
best decision rule more closely approximates the first-best decision rule and thus makes
better use of information. Consequently, the sender optimally reveals more information to
the receiver.27
5.3 Changing-Sign Bias
Now, suppose the receiver is highly responsive, and the players’ preferred decision rules
intersect at some state θ0 ∈ [1/2, 1), so that the receiver’s bias changes sign at θ0. In this case,
X consists of up to two intervals that shrink and eventually vanish as the players become
more patient. Then there exist δA, δB ∈ (0, 1) such that δA ≥ δB (with equality if and only if
θ0 = 1/2) and
X =

∅, if δ ∈ (δA, 1),
[0, θL) for some θL ∈ (0, 1), if δ ∈ (δB, δA),
[0, θL) ∪ (θH, 1] for some θL, θH ∈ (0, 1) such that θL < θH, if δ ∈ (0, δB).
27Relatedly, as Corollary 3 in Appendix D shows, more information is optimally revealed as the receiver
becomes less over-responsive to the state (that is, as ρ′R(θ) = a decreases).
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Proposition 7. Suppose the receiver is highly responsive and ρR(θ0) = ρFB(θ0) for some θ0 ∈
[1/2, 1). There exist δB∗ , δC∗ , δD∗ ∈ (0, 1) with either δB < δD∗ = δC∗ = δB∗ < δA or δD∗ < δC∗ < δB∗ =
δB such that the optimal pooling set is
P∗ =

∅, if δ ∈ (δA, 1),
[0, θL∗ ) for some θL∗ ∈ (θL, 1), if δ ∈ (δB∗ , δA),
[0, θL∗ ) ∪ (θH∗ , 1] for some θL∗ , θH∗ ∈ (θL, θH) such that θL∗ < θH∗ , if δ ∈ (δC∗ , δB∗ ),
[0, θM∗ ) ∪ (θM∗ , 1] for some θM∗ ∈ (0, 1), if δ ∈ (δD∗ , δC∗ ),
[0, 1], if δ ∈ [0, δD∗ ).
Further, dθL∗/dδ < 0 if δ ∈ (δC∗ , δA), and dθH∗ /dδ > 0 if δ ∈ (δC∗ , δB∗ ).
The proof of Proposition 7 relies on Proposition 5, because u∗(θ) has two inflection points
at θL and θH. Consider how the optimal pooling set P∗ changes as we decrease δ from δA to
0. For δ ∈ (δB, δA), the set X consists of one interval [0, θL) and, as in Proposition 6, over-
pooling occurs: P∗ = [0, θL∗ ) with θL∗ > θL. As δ decreases toward δB, the optimal pooling
threshold θL∗ increases. If complete pooling becomes optimal (θL∗ reaches 1) at δB∗ > δB, then
complete pooling remains optimal for all δ ∈ [0, δB∗ ).
Suppose now that optimal pooling remains incomplete (θL∗ < 1) when δ reaches δB. For
δ < δB, the set X consists of two disjoint intervals [0, θL) and (θH, 1]. Over-pooling takes
the following form. For δ ∈ (δC∗ , δB∗ ), each interval of X is separately over-pooled: P∗ =
[0, θL∗ ) ∪ (θH∗ , 1], with θL < θL∗ < θH∗ < θH. As δ decreases toward δC∗ , the optimal pooling
thresholds θL∗ and θH∗ move closer together, and the interval [θL∗ , θH∗ ] of fully separated states
shrinks. At δ = δC∗ , the optimal thresholds θL∗ and θH∗ meet at some θM∗ , so that (almost) all
states belong to one of the two pooling intervals [0, θM∗ ) and (θM∗ , 1]. The optimal pooling set
retains the form P∗ = [0, θM∗ ) ∪ (θM∗ , 1] over the range δ ∈ (δD∗ , δC∗ ).
As δ decreases below δD∗ , the optimal pooling set changes discontinuously to complete
pooling, P∗ = [0, 1]. This discontinuity arises because incentive compatible message rules
are required to be monotone. To build intuition for the discontinuity, suppose that θ0 = 1/2
and θ is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] (Figure 6). Within the range δ ∈ [0, δC∗ ), the optimal
pooling set P∗ is either [0, 1] or [0, θM∗ ) ∪ (θM∗ , 1], where θM∗ = 1/2 in this symmetric setting.
If δ = 0, then u∗ is concave on [0, 1]; so complete pooling is uniquely optimal, and, by
continuity, it remains uniquely optimal for some range δ ∈ [0, δD∗ ). Increasing δ within this
range does not improve the relationship; the monotonicity constraint is binding and the
receiver always makes the uninformed decision ρR(1/2).
As in Section 5.2, as the players become more patient, second-best decision-making im-
proves, and it cannot be optimal to reveal less information in the sense of Blackwell (1953).
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Figure 6: Highly responsive receiver with changing-sign bias
In fact, more information is optimally revealed as δ increases unless δ ∈ (δD∗ , δC∗ ). If δ ∈
(δD∗ , δC∗ ), so that P∗ = [0, θM∗ ) ∪ (θM∗ , 1], then θM∗ generally changes with δ and thus pooling
sets cannot be ranked by informativeness as δ changes.
5.4 Uniform Distribution
Assume further that the state is uniformly distributed:
Assumption 4. F(θ) = θ for all θ ∈ [0, 1].
Under Assumption 4, Propositions 6 and 7 can be restated in a closed form.28
Proposition 8. Suppose a > 2, a/2+ b < 1/2, and b > 14
√
(a− 2)a− (a− 1). Then the optimal
pooling set is
P∗ =

∅, if ` ∈ (`A∗ ,∞),
[0, θL∗ ) where θL∗ = γ (−`− b) , if ` ∈ (`B∗ , `A∗ ),
[0, θL∗ ) ∪ (θH∗ , 1] where θL∗ = γ (−`− b) and θH∗ = 1− γ (`+ 1− a− b) , if ` ∈ (`C∗ , `B∗ ),
[0, θM∗ ) ∪ (θM∗ , 1] where θM∗ = (a−2)a+16b`2((a−2)a+8`(1−a)) , if ` ∈ (`D∗ , `C∗ ),
[0, 1], if ` ∈ [0, `D∗ ),
where γ =
2
(
2(a− 1) +√a(a− 2))
3(a− 1)2 + 1 ,
(`A∗ , `B∗ , `C∗ , `D∗ ) =
(
−b, b + a− 1, 1
4
√
(a− 2)a, a− 2
4
max
{
a
4(a + b− 1) , 1
})
.
28Proposition 8 covers the case δD∗ < δC∗ < δB∗ = δB of Proposition 7. Proposition 6 and the remaining case
of Proposition 7 are covered in Appendix D.
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We discuss two implications of Proposition 8. First, over-pooling is proportional, θL∗ =
(a− 1)γθL and 1− θH∗ = (a− 1)γ(1− θH), where the over-pooling factor (a− 1)γ increases
with the receiver’s responsiveness a. Second, for a downwardly-biased (on average) re-
ceiver, θM∗ is below 1/2 and decreases with ` when [0, θM∗ ) ∪ (θM∗ , 1] is optimal.
Under Assumption 4, characterization of the sender’s worst equilibrium (Proposition 3)
can also be restated in a closed form.
Proposition 9. Suppose a/2 + b < 1/2. There exists an optimal equilibrium in single-period
punishment strategies where the sender’s penal decision rule is ρ(m) = m − ` for all m and the
sender’s penal message rule µ is represented by the pooling set P = [0, θL), with
θL =

0, if 1−aca2 (−bc− (1− c)(b− `)) > 332(1− c)2,
a
(
(1−c)+
√
(1−c)2−8 1−aca2 (−bc−(1−c)(b−`))
)
2(1−ac) , if
1−ac
a2 (−bc− (1− c)(b− `)) < 332(1− c)2.
Proposition 9 highlights two points. First, an upwardly-biased (on average) sender is
punished with the lowest incentive compatible decision rule. Second, punishing the sender
may or may not involve pooling. Pooling hurts the sender by making the decision adapt
less to the state, but benefits the sender by reducing his signaling transfers. Holding a and c
constant, an increase in ρS(0)− ρ(0) = −bc/(1− c)− (b− `) makes signaling transfers rela-
tively more effective as a punishment, and thus shrinks the optimal penal pooling set [0, θL).
6 Separation of Information and Control
In this section, we show how ‘arms-length’ organizational forms that separate information
and control enable effective informal communication and decision-making. We consider
two changes to the model that reduce the separation of information and control. In Sec-
tion 6.1, we introduce formal communication processes that mechanically increase trans-
parency. Specifically, we introduce a public signal about the state. In Section 6.2, we allow
for delegation of decision rights to informed players.
It turns out that improving public information or delegating decision rights to informed
players does not enable better informed decision-making. The availability of transfers as a
signaling device implies that better informed decision-making can always be achieved with-
out tightening incentive constraints, so an organizational form that brings information and
control together adds no informational benefits for the relationship. On the flip side, such
an organizational form tightens incentive constraints in two ways. First, it improves both
players’ worst possible equilibrium payoffs, and thus limits the severity of off-path pun-
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ishments. Second, it prevents information pooling, and thus limits the ability to discipline
decision-making in states of extreme conflict.
6.1 Transparency
We augment our model so that at the start of each period, the receiver observes a realization
of a state-dependent signal. We maintain Assumption 1 of Section 2, but do not impose
Assumptions 2 or 3. Just as with message rules, we assume that the signal rule ψ(θ) is
deterministic and (without loss) identify each signal realization s with the set of states that
induce it, s = {θ : ψ(θ) = s}. We also assume that the signal rule ψ is monotone in the sense
that each s ∈ ψ([0, 1]) is a convex set.
Since the signal and message rules are deterministic, we can restrict attention to message
rules that are refinements of the signal rule in that for each realization s of ψ there exists
a realization m of µ such that m ⊂ s. In particular, this restriction allows us to consider
decision rules ρ that depend on the message m but not the signal realization s, because m
incorporates all information contained in s.
The set of equilibrium payoffs V under signal ψ can be computed by applying Proposi-
tion 3 separately to each realization of signal ψ. In particular, the optimal and penal message
and decision rules are defined for each signal realization s ∈ ψ([0, 1]) as follows: ρ∗ is given
by (5) and µ∗ solves (7) given that the set of states is s rather than [0, 1]; ρR = ρR and µR = ψ;
and ρ
S
and µ
S
solve (8) given that the set of states is s.
We say that ψ is more informative than ψˆ if ψ is a refinement of ψˆ. For monotone signal
rules, this notion coincides with the informativeness criterion of Blackwell (1953). Signal
rule ψ is strictly more informative than ψˆ if ψ is more informative than ψˆ and the set of states
where ψ(θ) 6= ψˆ(θ) has strictly positive probability.
Proposition 10. Suppose that ψ is strictly more informative than ψˆ and let V and Vˆ be the corre-
sponding equilibrium payoff sets. If ρ
S
(µ
S
(θ)) is nondecreasing in θ under ψ, then V ( Vˆ.
By Proposition 3, ρ
S
(µ
S
(θ)) is nondecreasing in θ on each signal realization s but may
decrease across signal realizations; thus, the assumption in Proposition 10 that ρ
S
(µ
S
(θ)) is
nondecreasing in θ is not innocuous. This assumption holds if Assumptions 3 and 4 hold
and ρR(θ) does not cross ρFB(θ) from above for θ ∈ [0, 1].29 Moreover, this assumption holds
if δ = 0 or ψ(θ) = θ for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. In contrast, Proposition 3 implies that ρ∗(µ∗(θ)) and
ρ
R
(µ
R
(θ)) are always nondecreasing in θ.
29This statement follows from Proposition 9. Conversely, if Assumptions 3 and 4 hold, ` > 0, and ρS(θ)
crosses ρR(θ) from below at θ0 ∈ (0, 1), then ρS(µS(θ)) is not nondecreasing in θ on [0, 1] for some ψ. For
example, ρS(µS(θ)) jumps down from θ0 + ` to θ0 − ` at θ0 if ψ contains signal realizations (θ0 − ε, θ0) and
(θ0, θ0 + ε) for sufficiently small ε.
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To build intuition for Proposition 10, we start with the myopic benchmark. We will argue
that the set of equilibrium payoffs V expands when moving from a fully informative public
signal (ψ f (θ) = θ) to a completely uninformative public signal (ψu(θ) = [0, 1]). Specifically,
vS and vR strictly decrease and v weakly increases.
The receiver’s worst equilibrium payoff vR is lower under ψu than ψ f . In the receiver’s
worst equilibrium, the receiver always chooses her preferred decision ρR(ψ(θ)) given the
public signal ψ and always receives zero transfers. Public information improves the re-
ceiver’s decision-making and thus her worst equilibrium payoff.
The sender’s worst equilibrium payoff vS is lower under ψu than ψ f . The basic idea is
that any equilibrium decision outcome implemented under ψ f (and thus a fully informed
receiver) can also be implemented under ψu by inducing the sender to fully reveal the state
to the receiver. The sender’s payoff vS is strictly smaller under ψu because inducing full
separation requires the sender to make positive interim transfers to the receiver.
The best joint payoff v is weakly higher under ψu than ψ f , again because any equilib-
rium under ψ f can be implemented under ψu. In fact, the best joint payoff may be strictly
higher under ψu than ψ f . Under ψu, the joint payoff is maximized under complete pooling
of the states if the receiver is highly responsive (see Section 5.1). Such pooling, however, is
precluded under ψ f (and thus a fully informed receiver).
In the non-myopic case, these effects are preserved, and are further amplified by the
shadow of the future. Moving from ψ f to ψu expands V and thus increases the relational
leeway ` (which increases with v and decreases with with vS and vR). This in turn relaxes
constraints on decision-making and expands the set V even further.
The result that public information hurts the relationship relates to various papers that
study the social value of public information. Hirshleifer (1971) argues that welfare may be
decreasing in the amount of public information available to agents. Bergemann and Morris
(2016) clarifies this point: making more information available to an agent may, by increas-
ing the set of incentive constraints she faces, shrink the set of equilibrium outcomes.30 This
relates to the logic of our model, where the availability of public information makes it impos-
sible to pool incentive constraints across states, and thus worsens incentive provision within
the relationship. Public information in our model also improves the worst possible equilib-
rium payoffs for both players; this decreases the surplus and thus worsens intertemporal
incentives.31
30Crémer (1995), Kolotilin (2015), and Fong and Li (2016) discuss other settings where public information
may be detrimental.
31This point relates to an insight from Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994). There, objective performance
measures, rather than transparency, improve the players’ outside options and make cooperation within the
relationship more difficult to sustain.
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6.2 Allocation of Authority
In our model of Section 2, decision-making authority always resides with the receiver and
is not transferable (receiver-authority). Consider a variation of the model where the sender
chooses the decision instead of the receiver; call this variation sender-authority. For simplicity,
assume that the payoffs are quadratic, so that Assumption 3 holds, and that the receiver is
downwardly biased, so that ρR(θ) < ρFB(θ) for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. Denote λR = c and λS = 1− c,
and focus on the case λS = λR, so that the sender has the same temptation to defect from
the first-best decision under sender-authority as the receiver has under receiver-authority.
In this case, full separation is always optimal under receiver-authority.
It turns out that allocating decision authority to the sender strictly decreases the best joint
payoff. This is because the worst equilibrium joint payoff is strictly higher,32 and thus the
relational leeway is strictly smaller, under sender-authority. This implies that all our results
continue to hold even if decision-making authority could be allocated to either player at the
beginning of the game, because the players would always choose receiver-authority over
sender-authority.
When λS 6= λR, two additional effects make the comparison between sender- and receiver-
authority more nuanced. The first effect favours giving authority to the player who cares
more about the decision. Under i-authority where i ∈ {S, R}, the temptation to defect from
the first-best decision is λi (ρi(θ)− ρFB(θ))2 /2 = λiλ2−i (ρi(θ)− ρ−i(θ))2 /2, which is higher
than the corresponding temptation under (−i)-authority when λi < λ−i. The second effect
weakly favours receiver-authority. Under receiver-authority, when λR < λS, the optimal
equilibrium may involve pooling to discipline decision-making; this tool is unavailable un-
der sender-authority.
Consider another variation where decision-making authority is allocated at the begin-
ning of each period (short-term-authority). Specifically, following Baker, Gibbons and Mur-
phy (2011), suppose that at the beginning of each period, the receiver has decision-making
authority by default, and can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to transfer authority to the
sender for that period in exchange for a transfer. As above, focus on the case λS = λR.
We know from above that the best (worst) equilibrium joint payoff is higher (lower) un-
der receiver-authority than under sender-authority. This implies that relative to receiver-
authority, short-term-authority does not improve on the best equilibrium joint payoff (be-
32Under sender-authority, vS = E[(ρS(θ))2]/4 because the sender can always choose his preferred decision
in each state, whereas vR = E[ρR(θ)(ρS(θ) + `) − (ρS(θ) + `)2/2]/2 because ρS(θ) + ` is the worst possible
decision for the (downwardly biased) receiver that is enforceable for the sender. On the other hand, under
receiver-authority, vR = (ρR(E[θ]))2/4 < E[(ρR(θ))2]/4 because the receiver can always choose the unin-
formed decision ρR(E[θ]), whereas vS < E[ρS(θ)(ρR(θ) − `) − (ρR(θ) − `)2/2]/2 because full separation,
non-negative interim transfers by the sender, and decision ρR(θ) − ` can be achieved in equilibrium. Thus,
the worst equilibrium joint payoff is strictly higher under sender-authority.
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cause the players cannot do better than to allocate authority to the receiver in each period),
but increases the worst equilibrium joint payoff (because the players always have the option
to allocate authority to the sender in each period). This then implies that the relational lee-
way, and thus the best equilibrium joint payoff, is strictly lower under short-term-authority
than under receiver-authority.
The standard rationale for delegation is that the better-informed player can more effec-
tively adapt the decision. For example, Dessein (2002) and Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek
(2008) explore the tradeoff between allocating authority to an uninformed receiver versus an
informed but biased sender.33 The standard rationale for delegation no longer applies in our
setting because interim transfers can credibly achieve arbitrary communication outcomes at
no welfare cost.
7 Discussion of Model Assumptions
We discuss some of our modeling assumptions and highlight the extent to which our results
depend on these assumptions.
7.1 Exogenous Outside Options
We follow Abreu (1988) and Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) in characterizing the entire
set of equilibrium payoffs. In particular, optimal equilibria utilize the worst possible equi-
libria as off-path punishments. One alternative modeling approach taken by Levin (2003)
is to specify exogenous outside option payoffs uS and uR for both players; so that players
are punished for deviations by receiving their outside option payoffs thereafter. In this ap-
proach, at the beginning of each period, the receiver makes an offer to the sender consisting
of a contractible commitment to an ex-ante transfer. If the sender rejects this offer, the play-
ers receive their outside option payoffs, and time moves on to the next period. Another
alternative modeling approach taken by Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994, 2002) is to re-
strict attention to trigger strategy equilibria where off-path punishments correspond to some
static equilibria of the stage game. Our results continue to hold in these settings, with the
worst equilibrium payoffs equal to either the outside option payoffs or the static equilibrium
payoffs.
33Relatedly, Holmstrom (1984), Melumad and Shibano (1991), Martimort and Semenov (2006), Alonso and
Matouschek (2008), Goltsman et al. (2009), Kovácˇ and Mylovanov (2009), and Amador and Bagwell (2013)
study the optimal delegation problem. Lim (2012) and Lim (2014) allow authority to be allocated after the
sender observes the state.
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7.2 Imperfect Monitoring
We have assumed perfect monitoring in that all actions of the sender and the receiver are im-
mediately publicly observed. Consider a variation in which the receiver’s decision is imper-
fectly monitored. Specifically, suppose that the receiver’s (private) decision d stochastically
determines an output y = d+ ε which is publicly observed and replaces d as an argument in
the players’ payoff functions that satisfy Assumption 3: uR(y, θ) = c((aθ + b)y− y2/2) and
u(y, θ) = θy− y2/2. Assume that E[ε] = 0 and that the density g of ε satisfies the appro-
priate Mirrlees-Rogerson conditions (Rogerson, 1985), ensuring that the receiver’s decision
choice can be represented by a first-order condition.
Focusing on the case where the receiver is downwardly biased, consider the highest de-
cision ρ(m) that can be supported in equilibrium. Parallel to Theorem 6 of Levin (2003),
ρ(m) can be implemented by the strongest ‘one-step’ incentive scheme that satisfies the self-
enforcement constraint: this scheme may take the form of stationary continuation payoffs
vS(θ) = vS, vR(θ) = v− vS and the ex-post transfer rule
TR(y) = −TS(y) =
0, if y ≥ ρ(m) + ε∗,L(v), if y < ρ(m) + ε∗
where ε∗ is the point where g′(ε) switches from negative to positive. The receiver’s (unob-
served) decision then satisfies the first-order condition
∂
∂d
E
[
λR(ρR(m)(d + ε)− (d + ε)2/2)− TR(d + ε))
]∣∣∣
d=ρ(m)
= 0,
which simplifies to ρ(m) = ρR(m) + ` for some ` > 0. In other words, the self-enforcement
constraint effectively specifies that the equilibrium decision cannot exceed the receiver’s
preferred decision by more than the leeway `. (As before, the sender’s incentive problem
does not contribute to the self-enforcement constraint.) Consequently, retracing the steps of
our analysis, our results continue to hold in this variation.
7.3 Correlated States
We have assumed that the state θt is i.i.d. across periods. Consider a variation where θt
is correlated across periods. Specifically, introduce a finite-valued random variable ωt that
is publicly observed at the beginning of each period t (before ex-ante transfers are made),
where ωt is a Markov chain. The realization of ωt fully determines the (time-independent)
distribution F(θt|ωt) of the state θt. Crucially, given ωt, θt contains no further information
about ωt+1 (and thus about θt+1); so the sender and the receiver are always symmetrically
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informed about the future distribution of states. Note that this property would no longer
hold if we did not introduce ωt, but simply assumed that θt was a Markov chain.
With this modification, without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to equilibria
that are stationary conditional on ωt. Consequently, our results continue to hold, except that
the key objects such as V, `, and θ∗ are now functions of ωt.
8 Conclusion
In our model, incomplete information transmission does not reflect a failure to motivate
communication, but instead is an instrument for managing decision-making. This find-
ing relies on the capacity of voluntary transfers to credibly support any monotone message
rule at no welfare cost. It suggests that when modeling strategic communication in applied
settings, it is crucial to understand whether monetary or non-monetary transfers (such as
wages or favours) are available, because our implications differ significantly from those of
the standard literature on strategic communication without transfers. In fact, one interpre-
tation of our model is that voluntary transfers endogenously endow the privately-informed
sender with the ability to commit to any monotone message rule, even with impatient play-
ers. Such commitment is the premise of the literature on Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica
and Gentzkow 2011). So, our analysis extends the applicability of the Bayesian persuasion
framework to settings without commitment but with transfers.
Our model is remarkably tractable and thus allows for a thorough treatment of repeated
interactions. This analysis produces a rich and intuitive set of results. In particular, incom-
plete information transmission is implemented only for states of extreme conflict, and only if
the receiver’s decision-making is too responsive to information. One implication is that with
constant bias, pooling does not occur. In contrast, in the standard constant-bias cheap-talk
game (Crawford and Sobel 1982), information transmission is always incomplete, and this
is generally exacerbated in high (low) states if the sender is upwardly (downwardly) biased.
In our model, an ‘arms-length’ approach with separation of information and control ben-
efits the relationship. This provides a rationale for opaque organizations which put infor-
mation in the hands of superiors and prevent subordinates from acquiring information else-
where. A related implication is that mediators who control the flow of information from the
sender to the receiver cannot improve the relationship. This is because it is optimal to give
the sender as much control over the release of information as possible.
We hope that future work will use our tractable framework to study other challeng-
ing problems in strategic communication. For example, one might examine the case with
multiple senders and receivers, possibly connected by a communication network. Another
promising avenue would be to allow for costly information acquisition.
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Appendix A Stationarity
This appendix specifies necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium, and proves
Lemma 1.
To show that the set of equilibrium payoffs is compact, restrict decisions and transfers
to compact sets d ∈ [−d, d] and τi, ti, Ti ∈ [−t, t] for i ∈ {S, R}. Under this restriction and
under Assumption 1, it can be shown that the set of equilibrium payoffs is compact (see, for
example, Mailath and Samuelson 2006). Now, observe that this restriction is without loss
of generality if the bounds d and t are chosen to be large enough that (in any equilibrium)
decisions and transfers are interior. Indeed, under Assumption 1, we can show that such
bounds exist.
We now show that the set of equilibrium payoffs is the simplex V defined by (1). Con-
sider an optimal equilibrium payoff vector
(
v∗S, v
∗
R
)
with v∗S + v
∗
R = v, and let σ∗ be an equi-
librium supporting
(
v∗S, v
∗
R
)
. Let (vS, vR) be any point in the simplex V. Notice that we can
modify σ∗ to produce (vS, vR) by changing only the ex-ante transfers in the first period from
τ∗i to τi = τ
∗
i + (v
∗
i − vi)/(1− δ) for each i ∈ {S, R}. The modified ex-ante transfers remain
feasible, τS + τR ≥ 0, because vS + vR ≤ v∗S + v∗R by definition of V. Further, this mod-
ification affects the players’ incentives only at the ex-ante round of the first period. Each
player is willing to make the ex-ante transfer τi because vS ≥ vS and vR ≥ vR by definition
of V. Thus, the modified strategy profile is an equilibrium. Conversely, it is easy to see
that any (vS, vR) /∈ V cannot be supported in equilibrium. We conclude that V is the set of
equilibrium payoffs.
A message rule µ(θ), a decision rule ρ(m), transfer rules τi, ti(m), Ti(m), continuation
payoff function vi(m), for each i ∈ {S, R}, and punishment decision dp and message mp
constitute an equilibrium if and only if the following seven conditions hold (see, for exam-
ple, Mailath and Samuelson 2006):
C1. Each player i is willing to make ex-ante transfer τi:
vS = (1− δ)[−τS +E[uS(ρ(µ(θ)), θ)− tS(µ(θ))− TS(µ(θ))]] + δE[vS(µ(θ))] ≥ vS;
vR = (1− δ)[−τR +E[uR(ρ(µ(θ)), θ)− tR(µ (θ))− TR(µ(θ))]] + δE[vR(µ(θ))] ≥ vR.
C2. For each state θ, the sender is willing to send message µ(θ) and to make interim trans-
fer tS(µ(θ)).
(a) There is no profitable deviation to another message – interim-transfer pair
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(
µ(θˆ), tS(µ(θˆ))
)
that is observed on the equilibrium path:
(1− δ)[uS(ρ(µ(θ)), θ)− tS(µ(θ))− TS(µ(θ))] + δvS(µ(θ))
≥ (1− δ)[uS(ρ(µ(θˆ)), θ)− tS(µ(θˆ))− TS(µ(θˆ))] + δvS(µ(θ)) for all θ, θˆ ∈ [0, 1].
(It is without loss of generality to let tS depend on µ(θ) but not directly on θ; since
the sender makes his interim transfer choice before the receiver, we can always
modify µ(θ) to incorporate any additional information contained in tS without
changing the receiver’s information set.)
(b) There is no profitable deviation to some pair (mˆ, tˆS) that is never observed on the
equilibrium path:
(1− δ)[uS(ρ(µ(θ)), θ)− tS(µ(θ))− TS(µ(θ))] + δvS(µ(θ))
≥ (1− δ)uS(dp, θ) + δvS for all θ ∈ [0, 1].
Here, we specify that following any such deviation, the receiver chooses punish-
ment decision dp.
C3. The receiver is willing to make interim transfer tR(m):
(1− δ)[uR(ρ(m), m)− tR(m)− TR(m)] + δvR(m)
≥ (1− δ)uR(ρR(m), m) + δvR for all m ∈ µ([0, 1]).
C4. The receiver is willing to choose decision ρ(m) on-path and dp off-path.
(a) After an on-path message – interim-transfer pair, the receiver is willing to choose
decision ρ(m):
(1− δ)[uR(ρ(m), m)− TR(m)] + δvR(m)
≥ (1− δ)uR(ρR(m), m) + δvR for all m ∈ µ([0, 1]).
(b) After an off-path message – interim-transfer pair, the receiver is willing to choose
decision dp:
(1− δ)uR(dp, mp) + δ(v− vS) ≥ (1− δ)uR(ρR(mp), mp) + δvR.
Here, we specify that following any deviation by the sender, the receiver believes
that the state is in mp ⊂ [0, 1].
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C5. Each player i is willing to make ex-post transfer Ti(m):
−(1− δ)TS(m) + δvS(m) ≥ δvS for all m ∈ µ([0, 1]);
−(1− δ)TR(m) + δvR(m) ≥ δvR for all m ∈ µ([0, 1]).
C6. The continuation payoffs can be supported in equilibrium:
(vS(m), vR(m)) ∈ V for all m ∈ µ([0, 1]).
C7. There is no creation of money:
τS + τR ≥ 0;
tS (m) + tR (m) ≥ 0 for all m ∈ µ([0, 1]);
TS (m) + TR (m) ≥ 0 for all m ∈ µ([0, 1]).
Proof of Lemma 1. We have already shown that the set of equilibrium payoffs is the simplex V
defined by (1). In any optimal equilibrium, continuation is optimal: (i) vS(m) + vR (m) = v
for all θ, and (ii) money is not burned, that is, the constraints of Condition C7 hold with
equality. Otherwise, one could (i) increase vR(m) without violating Condition C6, and (ii)
decrease transfers τR, tR (m), and TR (m), thereby relaxing the constraints of Conditions C1–
C5 and increasing joint payoff vS + vR.
An optimal equilibrium σ with zero first-period ex-ante transfers clearly exists. Let
(vS, vR) be the payoff vector under σ. We will modify σ to construct an optimal station-
ary equilibrium with the same payoff vector. Let µ(θ), ρ(m), ti(m), Ti(m), and vi(m), for
each i ∈ {S, R}, be the message rule, decision rule, transfer rules, and continuation payoff
function in the first period on the equilibrium path of σ. Define T∗i (m) by
− (1− δ) T∗i (m) + δvi = −(1− δ)Ti(m) + δvi(m).
Consider the following stationary strategy profile σ∗. On the equilibrium path, µ(θ),
ρ(m), τi = 0, ti(m), and T∗i (m) are played in each period. Following any deviation, except
for an undetectable deviation by the sender as in Condition C2(a), play proceeds according
to σ. By construction, the sender’s and receiver’s expected payoffs under σ∗ are the same as
under σ.
We now show that σ∗ constitutes an equilibrium. In each period the constraints of Con-
ditions C1 – C5 continue to hold under σ∗ because they are identical to the first-period con-
straints under σ, as −(1 − δ)T∗i (m) + δvi replaces −(1 − δ)Ti(m) + δvi(m). Condition C6
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holds because (vS, vR) belongs to V by supposition. Further, since vS + vR = vS (m) +
vR (m) = v and TS(m) + TR(m) = 0 by optimality of σ, we have T∗S (m) + T
∗
R (m) = 0, so
Condition C7 holds.
Finally, by modifying the first-period ex-ante transfer in σ∗ from 0 to τi = (vi − vˆi)/(1−
δ) for i ∈ {S, R}, we can support any equilibrium payoff vector (vˆS, vˆR) ∈ V.
Lemma 3. If 0 ≤ δ < δˆ < 1, then the corresponding equilibrium payoff sets satisfy V ⊂ Vˆ.
Proof. Given δ ∈ [0, 1), consider a stationary optimal equilibrium σ∗ with zero ex-ante trans-
fers. Let this equilibrium produce an equilibrium payoff vector (v∗S, v
∗
R), with v
∗
S + v
∗
R = v.
We can support any equilibrium payoff vector (vS, vR) ∈ V by modifying the first-period
ex-ante transfer in σ∗ from 0 to τi = (v∗i − vi)/(1− δ) for each i ∈ {S, R}. Notice that Con-
ditions C1 – C7 continue to hold under δˆ ∈ (δ, 1), after replacing τi = (v∗i − vi)/(1− δ) with
τˆi = (v∗i − vi)/(1− δˆ), because
δˆ
1− δˆ (v
∗
i − vi) ≥
δ
1− δ (v
∗
i − vi) for each i ∈ {S, R}.
Therefore, the set V is self-generating under δˆ, which proves that V ⊂ Vˆ (see, for example,
Mailath and Samuelson 2006).
Appendix B Equilibrium
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider a stationary equilibrium σ that produces a joint payoff v. Let
µ(θ), ρ(m), τi, ti(m), and Ti(m), for i ∈ {S, R}, be the message rule, decision rule, and
transfer rules on the equilibrium path of σ. Define US(θ) as the one-period payoff of the
sender if the state is θ,
US(θ) = uS(ρ(µ(θ)), θ)− p(θ),
where p(θ) is the net one-period transfer of the sender if the state is θ,
p(θ) = τS + tS(µ(θ)) + TS(µ(θ)).
Condition C2 (a) requires that
US(θ) ≥ uS(ρ(µ(θˆ)), θ)− p(θˆ) for all θ, θˆ ∈ [0, 1].
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Since ∂2uS(d, θ)/∂d∂θ > 0 by Assumption 1, this inequality holds if and only if ρ(µ(θ)) is
nondecreasing in θ and
US(θ) = US(0) +
ˆ θ
0
∂uS
∂θ
(ρ(µ(θ˜)), θ˜)dθ˜ for all θ ∈ [0, 1], (18)
by Proposition 1 of Rochet (1987) and Corollary 1 of Milgrom and Segal (2002).
Adding the constraint of Condition C4 (a) and the sender’s constraint of Condition C5,
and taking into account that TS(m) + TR(m) ≥ 0 and vS + vR = v, gives (2).
Conversely, suppose that µ(θ) and ρ(m) are such that ρ(µ(θ)) is nondecreasing in θ and
(2) holds. We construct transfer rules and punishment variables that satisfy Conditions C1 –
C7, and thus constitute a stationary equilibrium. We consider the case δ > 0; the case δ = 0 is
simpler but slightly different. Let TS(m) = TR(m) = 0 and τS = −τR = E[uS(ρ(µ(θ)), θ)−
tS(µ(θ))]− vS. Moreover, let tS(m) and mp be defined by (3) and (4), and let dp = ρ(mp).
Equation (4) assumes that tS(mp) = infm∈µ([0,1]) tS(m) for some message mp ∈ µ([0, 1]).
If this assumption does not hold, then we specify mp and dp as follows. By the Bolzano-
Weierstrass theorem, there exists a sequence {mk} ∈ µ([0, 1]) such that as k → ∞, tS(mk) →
infm∈µ([0,1]) tS(m), θ(mk)→ θ?, and ρ(mk)→ d? for some θ(mk) ∈ mk, θ? ∈ [0, 1], and d? ∈ R.
Set mp = θ? and dp = d?. Since uR(d, θ) is continuous, and (2) holds for all (mk, ρ(mk)), it
also holds for (mp, dp).
Notice that the lefthand side of (2) is nonnegative, so v ≥ vS + vR. The constraints
of Condition C7 hold with equality. Condition C6 holds because the continuation pay-
offs are vS = vS and vR = v − vS. Condition C5 holds because Condition C6 holds and
TS(m) = TR(m) = 0. The sender’s constraint of Condition C1 holds with equality. The
receiver’s constraint of Condition C1 holds because it can be simplified to v ≥ vS + vR. Con-
dition C2 (a) holds because ρ(µ(θ)) is nondecreasing in θ and (18) holds. Condition C2 (b)
holds because by deviating to a message-transfer pair (mˆ, tˆS) that is not observed on the
equilibrium path, the sender induces dp = ρ (mp), which he can induce more cheaply on the
equilibrium path with message mp and zero interim transfer tS (mp) = 0. This argument as-
sumes that there exists mp such that tS(mp) = infm∈µ([0,1]) tS(m). Condition C2 (b) still holds
even if such mp does not exist. This is because Condition C2 (a) holds for each θˆ = θ(mk),
and thus in the limit k → ∞. But in this limit, Condition C2 (a) coincides with Condition
C2 (b). Condition C4 is a restatement of (2). Note that, as for Condition C2 (b), a limiting
argument needs to be made for Condition C4 (b) if infm∈µ([0,1]) tS(m) is not attained by any
mp. Condition C3 holds because Condition C4 holds and tR(m) is nonpositive.
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Proof of Proposition 2. By Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, in an optimal equilibrium, the decision
and message rules solve
v = max
µ,ρ
E[u(ρ(µ(θ)), θ)] (19)
subject to ρ(µ(θ)) is nondecreasing in θ, (20)
wR(ρ(m), m) ≤ L(v) for all m ∈ µ([0, 1]). (21)
Without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to monotone message rules. The
argument is similar to the revelation principle. To this end, consider any µ and ρ that satisfy
(20) and (21). Define new rules µ˜ and ρ˜ as µ˜(θ˜) = {θ : ρ(µ(θ)) = ρ(µ(θ˜))} for all θ˜ ∈ [0, 1]
and ρ˜(m˜) = ρ(µ(θ˜(m˜))) for all m˜ ∈ µ˜([0, 1]), where θ˜(m˜) is an arbitrary state θ˜ ∈ m˜. It is
easy to see that d˜(m˜) is independent of the choice of a representative state θ˜ ∈ m˜ and that
ρ˜(µ˜(θ)) = ρ(µ(θ)) for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. Since ρ(µ(θ)) is nondecreasing in θ by (20), ρ˜(µ˜(θ)) is
also nondecreasing in θ and µ˜ is monotone. Moreover, since each set m˜ ∈ µ˜([0, 1]) is the
union of some disjoint sets m ∈ µ([0, 1]) and the constraint (21) holds for ρ(m) for each
m ∈ µ([0, 1]), the constraint (21) also holds for ρ˜(m˜) for each m˜ ∈ µ˜([0, 1]).
Consider a relaxed problem
v = max
µ,ρ
E[u(ρ(µ(θ)), θ)]
subject to µ is monotone,
wR(ρ(m), m) ≤ L(v) for all m ∈ µ([0, 1]).
We can solve this relaxed problem in two steps. First, for a given monotone message rule µ,
the optimal decision rule is given by ρ∗ defined by (5). Second, given the optimal decision
rule ρ∗, the optimal message rule is clearly µ∗ defined by (7). To prove that the solution ρ∗
and µ∗ to the relaxed problem are the actual optimal decision and message rules that solve
the problem (19), it remains to show that ρ∗(m) is nondecreasing in m.
We first rewrite the constraint of the problem (5) as d ∈ D(m) where D(m) is nonde-
creasing in m in the strong set order. Since uR(d, θ) is strictly concave in d and has a unique
maximum, wR(d, m) is strictly convex in d and has a unique minimum. Taking into ac-
count that wR(ρR(m), m) = 0 and L(v) ≥ 0, we have that the set of decisions d that satisfy
the constraint of the problem (5) is a nonempty closed convex set and thus can be written
as D(m) = [ρ−(m), ρ+(m)], where ρ−(m) and ρ+(m) satisfy the constraint with equality.
Moreover, since uR(d, θ) is concave in d and is supermodular, wR(d, m) is nonincreasing in d
and nondecreasing in m if d < ρR(m), and wR(d, m) is nondecreasing in d and nonincreasing
in m if d > ρR(m). This implies that ρ−(m) and ρ+(m) are nondecreasing in m, and thus
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D(m) is nondecreasing in m. Taking into account that u(d, m) is strictly concave and has
increasing differences, ρ∗(m) = arg maxd∈D(m) u(d, m) is nondecreasing in m, as follows, for
example, from Theorem 4 of Milgrom and Shannon (1994).
Proof of Proposition 3. By Proposition 2, v = E[u∗(ρ∗(µ∗(θ)), θ)].
A receiver’s worst equilibrium with zero first-period ex-ante transfers (τS = τR = 0)
clearly exists. Let µ(θ), tR(m), ρ(m), TR(m), and vR(m) be used in the first period of such an
equilibrium. Thus,
vR = E[(1− δ)[uR(ρ(µ(θ)), µ(θ))− tR(µ(θ))− TR(µ(θ))] + δvR(µ(θ))]
≥ E[(1− δ)uR(ρR(µ(θ)), µ(θ)) + δvR]
≥ (1− δ)uR(ρR([0, 1]), [0, 1]) + δvR,
where the equality follows from τR = 0, the first inequality follows from Condition C3, and
the last inequality follows from the definition of ρR. Rearranging gives
vR ≥ uR(ρR([0, 1]), [0, 1]).
Similarly, a sender’s worst equilibrium with zero first-period ex-ante transfers exists. Let
µ(θ), tS(m), ρ(m), TS(m), vS(m), dp, and mp be used in the first period of such an equilib-
rium. Define VS(θ) as the expected payoff of the sender if the first-period state is θ,
VS(θ) = (1− δ)uS(ρ(µ(θ)), θ)− p(θ),
where p(θ) = (1− δ)[tS(µ(θ)) + TS(µ(θ))]− δvS(µ(θ)).
Condition C2 (a) requires that
VS(θ) ≥ (1− δ)uS(ρ(µ(θˆ)), θ)− p(θˆ) for all θ, θˆ ∈ [0, 1]. (22)
As explained in the proof of Proposition 1, this inequality holds if and only if
ρ(µ(θ)) is nondecreasing in θ, (23)
VS(θ) = VS(0) + (1− δ)
ˆ θ
0
∂uS
∂θ
(ρ(µ(θ˜)), θ˜)dθ˜ for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. (24)
Condition C2 (b), the constraint of Condition C4 (a) and the sender’s constraint of Condition
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C5, and the constraint of Condition C4 (b), respectively imply that
VS(θ) ≥ (1− δ)uS(dp, θ) + δvS for all θ ∈ [0, 1], (25)
wR(ρ(m), m) ≤ L(v) for all m ∈ µ([0, 1]), (26)
wR(dp, mp) ≤ L(v). (27)
Thus, vS is greater or equal than the value of the following problem
min
µ,ρ,VS,mp,dp
E [VS(θ)]
subject to (23) – (27).
(28)
Claim 1. There exists an optimal solution to the problem (28) such that mp ∈ µ([0, 1]), dp = ρ(mp),
and (25) holds with equality for θ ∈ mp.
Proof. Given ρ and µ that satisfy (23) and (26), define the function
h(m) = uS(ρ(m), θ(m))−
ˆ θ(m)
0
∂uS
∂θ
(ρ(µ(θ˜)), θ˜)dθ˜ (29)
where θ(m) ∈ m. Define
m? ∈ arg min
m∈µ([0,1])
h(m) and θ? ∈ m?.
Hereafter, we assume that the infimum of h is attained. If the infimum is not attained by any
m?, a limiting argument, as in the proof of Proposition 1, needs to be made. It is easy to see
that µ, ρ, mp = m?, θp = θ?, dp = ρ(mp), and
VS(θ) = (1− δ)
(
uS(ρ(mp), θp) +
ˆ θ
θp
∂uS
∂θ
(ρ(µ(θ˜)), θ˜)dθ˜
)
+ δvS (30)
constitute a feasible solution to the problem (28). In particular, (30) clearly satisfies (24), and
(25) holds because
VS(θ) = (1− δ) (uS(ρ(µ(θ)), θ)− (h(µ(θ))− h(mp))) + δvS
≥ (1− δ)uS(ρ(mp), θ) + δvS,
where the equality follows from (29) and (30), and the inequality follows from (22) evaluated
at θˆ = θ?, where (22) holds because (23) and (24) hold.
Suppose for contradiction that there does not exist an optimal solution to (28) with the
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stated properties. Thus, in an optimal solution, dp /∈ ρ(µ([0, 1])) and
uS(ρ(µ(θ)), θ)− (h(µ(θ))− h(m?)) > uS(dp, θ) for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. (31)
There are two cases to consider: dp ∈ (ρ(µ(0)), ρ(µ(1)) \ ρ(µ([0, 1])) and dp < ρ(µ(0)) (the
case dp > ρ(µ(1)) is analogous).
Suppose that dp ∈ (ρ(µ(0)), ρ(µ(1))) \ ρ(µ([0, 1])). Then there exists θˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that
dp ∈ (ρ(µ(θˆ−)), ρ(µ(θˆ+)). By continuity of uS and VS, we have
uS(ρ(µ(θˆ−)), θˆ)− (h(µ(θˆ−))− h(m?)) = uS(ρ(µ(θˆ+)), θˆ)− (h(µ(θˆ+))− h(m?)).
Since uS(d, θ) is concave in d by Assumption 1 and h(m) is minimized at m?, this equality is
incompatible with (31) evaluated at θˆ−, leading to a contradiction.
Suppose that dp < ρ(µ(0)). The optimal VS is such that (25) holds with equality for
some θ,
min
θ∈[0,1]
(VS(θ)− (1− δ)uS(dp, θ)) = δvS,
which can be rewritten using (24) as
(1− δ) min
θ∈[0,1]
ˆ θ
0
(
∂uS
∂θ
(ρ(µ(θ˜)), θ˜)− ∂uS
∂θ
(dp, θ˜)
)
dθ˜ = (1− δ)uS(dp, 0) + δvS −VS(0).
Since ∂2uS(d, θ)/∂d∂θ > 0 and ρ(µ(θ)) > dp, the minimum is achieved at θ = 0. Moreover,
(31) implies that uS(dp, 0) < uS(ρ(µ(0)), 0). Therefore, uS(ρ−(0), 0) ≤ uS(dp, 0) because
ρ−(0) ≤ dp by (27), dp < ρ(µ(0)) by supposition, and uS is concave in d. So an optimal
dp < ρ(µ(0)) must be given by ρ−(0) to minimize VS(0), and thus VS. But then we can
modify µ and ρ only in that µ separates θ = 0 and ρ(µ(0)) is replaced with ρ−(0). Under this
modification, we can support the same VS given by (24) with VS(0) = (1− δ)uS(ρ−(0), 0) +
δvS, leading to a contradiction.
Claim 1, together with (30), implies that vS is greater or equal than
min
µ,ρ,θp
{
uS(ρ(µ(θp)), θp) +E
[ˆ θ
θp
∂uS
∂θ
(ρ(µ(θ˜)), θ˜)dθ˜
]}
subject to ρ(µ(θ)) is nondecreasing in θ,
wR(ρ(m), m) ≤ L(v) for all m ∈ µ([0, 1]).
(32)
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Claim 2. There exists an optimal solution to the problem (32) that solves the problem (8).
Proof. Consider an optimal solution (µ, ρ, θp) to (32). Without loss of generality,
mp = µ(θp) = {θ : ρ(µ(θ)) = ρ(µ(θp))},
otherwise we can modify the message and decision rules such that all states in {θ : ρ(µ(θ)) =
ρ(µ(θp))} are pooled, the same decision ρ(µ(θ)) is induced for all θ, the constraints of (32)
hold, and the value of (32) remains the same. Moreover,
ρ(µ(θ)) =
ρ−(µ(θ)), if µ(θ) > mp,ρ+(µ(θ)), if µ(θ) < mp,
otherwise we can decrease the value of (32) without violating the constraints either by de-
creasing ρ(µ(θ)) for µ(θ) > mp or by increasing ρ(µ(θ)) for µ(θ) < mp.
Suppose for contradiction that there does not exist an optimal solution to (32) with ρ(mp) ∈
{ρ−(mp), ρ+(mp)}. Consider an optimal solution such that no other optimal solution has a
strictly larger mp in the set order. If θp = sup mp < 1, then some states adjacent to mp
from above, say (θ
p
, θ
p
+ ε), must be pooled, otherwise we can decrease the value of (32)
by pooling states (θ
p
, θ
p
+ ε) and mp and inducing the same decision ρ(mp). Similarly, if
θp = inf mp > 0, then some states adjacent to mp from below, say (θp − ε, θp), must be
pooled. Notice that the objective function in (32) is concave in ρ(mp); so we can decrease the
value of (32) without violating the constraints by changing ρ(mp) to at least one of the four
values ρ(µ(θ
p
+)), ρ(µ(θp−)), ρ+(mp), ρ−(mp), leading to a contradiction.
It remains to show that a single-period punishment strategy profile from Proposition 3
can be supported in an equilibrium using the ex-ante transfers T 0, T S, T R given by
T 0 = T S = E[uS(ρ∗(µ∗(θ)), θ)− t0(µ∗(θ))]− vS,
(1− δ)[T R +E[uR(ρ∗(µ∗(θ)), θ) + t0(µ∗(θ))]] + δ(v− vS) = vR.
The constraints of Condition C7 hold with equality. Condition C6 holds because the contin-
uation payoffs are vS(m) = vS and vR(m) = v− vS. Condition C5 holds because Condition
C6 holds and TS(m) = TR(m) = 0. The sender’s (receiver’s) constraint of Condition C1
holds with equality for T 0 = T S (for T R). The receiver’s (sender’s) constraint of Condition
C1 holds for T 0 = T S (for T R) because it can be simplified to v ≥ vS + vR. Condition C2 (a)
holds because ρ
j
(µ
j
(θ)) is nondecreasing in θ and tj satisfies (3). Condition C2 (b) holds be-
cause by deviating to a message-transfer pair (mˆ, tˆ) that is not observed on the equilibrium
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path, the sender induces dpj = ρj(m
p
j ), which he can induce more cheaply on the equilibrium
path with message mpj and zero interim transfer tj(m
p
j ) = 0, as required by (4). Condition C4
(a) holds because wR(ρj(m), m) ≤ L(v) for all m ∈ µj([0, 1]). Condition C4 (b) holds because
Condition C4 (a) holds and dpj = ρj(m
p
j ). Condition C3 holds because Condition C4 holds
and tj(m) is nonpositive.
Appendix C Monotone Persuasion
Proof of Lemma 2. Since u∗(θ) is twice continuously differentiable in θ almost everywhere,
we can integrate by parts twice and write the expected joint payoff as
ˆ 1
0
u∗(θ)dGP(θ) = u∗(θ)GP(θ)|10 −
ˆ 1
0
u′∗(θ)GP(θ)dθ
= u∗(θ)GP(θ)|10 − u′∗(θ)ΓP(θ)
∣∣1
0 +
ˆ 1
0
u′′∗ (θ)ΓP(θ)dθ
=u∗(1)− u′∗(1)(1−E[θ]) +
ˆ 1
0
u′′∗ (θ)ΓP(θ)dθ, (33)
where the last equality follows from
ΓP(1) =
ˆ 1
0
GP(θ)dθ = θGP(θ)|10 −
ˆ 1
0
θdGP(θ) = 1−E[θ].
Since only the last term of (33) depends on P, the proposition follows.
Lemma 4. For all open P ⊂ [0, 1],
1. ΓP(θ) is convex in θ.
2. Γ[0,1](θ) ≤ ΓP(θ) ≤ Γ∅(θ) for all θ ∈ [0, 1].
3. ΓP(θ) = Γ∅(θ) if and only if θ /∈ P.
Proof. Part 1 holds because ΓP(θ) =
´ θ
0 GP(θ˜)dθ˜ and GP(θ) is a (non-decreasing) distribution
function. For parts 2 and 3, we first show that
ˆ θ
0
GP(θ˜)dθ˜ = ΓP(θ) ≤ Γ∅(θ) =
ˆ θ
0
F(θ˜)dθ˜ for all θ ∈ [0, 1],
with equality if and only if θ /∈ P. It is sufficient to observe that for each disjoint interval
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(ξi, ζi) of P, we have
ˆ θ
ξi
GP(θ˜)dθ˜ = F(ξi)(θ − ξi) <
ˆ θ
ξi
F(θ˜)dθ˜ for θ ∈ (ξi,E[θ|(ξi, ζi)]),
ˆ ζi
θ
GP(θ˜)dθ˜ = F(ζi)(ζi − θ) >
ˆ ζi
θ
F(θ˜)dθ˜ for θ ∈ [E[θ|(ξi, ζi)], ζi),
ˆ ζi
ξi
GP(θ˜)dθ˜ = F(ξi)(E[θ|(ξi, ζi)]− ξi) + F(ζi)(ζi −E[θ|(ξi, ζi)]) =
ˆ ζi
ξi
F(θ˜)dθ˜,
where each line holds, respectively, because
F(ξi) < F(θ) for θ ∈ (ξi,E[θ|(ξi, ζi)]),
F(ζi) > F(θ) for θ ∈ [E[θ|(ξi, ζi)], ζi),ˆ ζi
ξi
F(θ˜)dθ˜ = F(θ)θ|ζiξi −
ˆ ζi
ξi
θ˜dF(θ˜) = F(ζi)ζi − F(ξi)ξi − (F(ζi)− F(ξi))E[θ|(ξi, ζi)].
Similarly, the remainder of part 2 that Γ[0,1](θ) ≤ ΓP(θ) for all θ ∈ [0, 1] follows from
ˆ θ
0
G[0,1](θ˜)dθ˜ ≤
ˆ θ
0
GP(θ˜)dθ˜ for θ ∈ (0,E[θ]),
ˆ 1
θ
G[0,1](θ˜)dθ˜ ≥
ˆ 1
θ
GP(θ˜)dθ˜ for θ ∈ [E[θ], 1),
ˆ 1
0
G[0,1](θ˜)dθ˜ =
ˆ 1
0
GP(θ˜)dθ˜,
where each line holds, respectively, because
G[0,1](θ) = 0 ≤ GP(θ) for θ ∈ (0,E[θ]),
G[0,1](θ) = 1 ≥ GP(θ) for θ ∈ [E[θ], 1),ˆ 1
0
GP(θ)dθ = θGP(θ)|10 −
ˆ 1
0
θdGP(θ) = 1−E[θ].
Lemma 5. P∗ = ∅ if and only if u′′∗ (θ) ≥ 0 for almost all θ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. The lemma follows from (9) and Lemma 4. In particular, if u′′∗ (θ) < 0 for θ in some
nonempty interval (ξ, ζ), then Γ(ξ,ζ)(θ) < Γ∅(θ) for θ ∈ (ξ, ζ) and Γ(ξ,ζ)(θ) = Γ∅(θ) for
θ /∈ (ξ, ζ); so P∗ 6= ∅.
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θL θ*L 1θ0y
L
Γ
Γ∅(θ)Γ(0,1)(θ)ΓP*(θ)ΓP(θ)
(a) yL > Γ[0,1](θL)
θL θ*L 1θyL=0
Γ Γ∅(θ)Γ(0,1)(θ)ΓP*(θ)ΓP(θ)
(b) yL = Γ[0,1](θL)
Figure 7: Optimal pooling set P∗ = [0, θL∗ )
Proof of Proposition 4. By Lemma 4, for any open P ⊂ [0, 1], we have Γ[0,1](θL) ≤ ΓP(θL) ≤
Γ∅(θL). Fix a value yL ∈ [Γ[0,1](θL), Γ∅(θL)]. Define (Figure 7)
θL∗ = min{θ ∈ [θL, 1] : Γ[0,θ)(θL) = yL}.
We first show that P∗ = [0, θL∗ ) uniquely solves a constrained problem (9) subject to the
additional constraint that ΓP(θL) = yL.
By Lemma 4, for any open P ⊂ [0, 1] such that ΓP(θL) = yL, we have ΓP(θ) is convex in
θ and Γ[0,1](θ) ≤ ΓP(θ) ≤ Γ∅(θ) for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. It is easy to verify (Figure 7) that for any
such ΓP, we have ΓP∗(θ) ≤ ΓP(θ) for θ < θL and ΓP∗(θ) ≥ ΓP(θ) for θ > θL. Moreover, at
least one of the two inequalities is strict for an open interval of θ if P 6= P∗. Since u′′∗ (θ) < 0
for θ < θL and u′′∗ (θ) > 0 for θ > θL, the set P∗ uniquely solves the constrained problem.
The expected payoff under P∗ is
v∗ =
ˆ 1
0
u∗(θ)dGP∗(θ) = F(θ
L∗ )u∗(mL∗) +
ˆ 1
θL∗
u∗(θ)dF(θ).
Thus, taking into account that
dmL∗
dθL∗
=
f (θL∗ )
F(θL∗ )
(θL∗ −mL∗),
we have
dv∗
dθL∗
= F(θL∗ )u′∗(mL∗)
dmL∗
dθL∗
+ f (θL∗ )u∗(mL∗)− f (θL∗ )u∗(θL∗ )
= f (θL∗ )
(
u′∗(mL∗)(θL∗ −mL∗) + u∗(mL∗)− u∗(θL∗ )
)
.
(34)
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θL θ*L θ*H θH 1θ0yL
yH
Γ Γ∅(θ)Γ(0,1)(θ)ΓP*(θ)ΓP(θ)
(a) θL∗ < θH∗
θL θ*L=θ*H θH 1θ0yL
yH
Γ Γ∅(θ)Γ(0,1)(θ)ΓP*(θ)ΓP(θ)
(b) θL∗ = θH∗
Figure 8: Optimal pooling set P∗ given θL∗ ≤ θH∗
Since u∗(θ) is strictly concave in θ on [0, θL), we have dv∗/dθL∗
∣∣
θL∗=θL
> 0 implying that
θL∗ > θL. Further, the necessary first-order condition is dv∗/dθL∗ = 0 if θL∗ < 1, which
simplifies to (11). By Proposition 3 of Kolotilin (2018), this condition is also sufficient. Also,
if (11) holds, then mL∗ < θL because u∗ is convex on (θL, 1]. If (11) does not hold for any
θL∗ ≤ 1, then dv∗/dθL∗
∣∣
θL∗=1
> 0; so θL∗ = 1 and mL∗ = E[θ] ∈ (0, θL).
Proof of Proposition 5. Define Y as the set of pairs (yL, yH) ∈ R2+ such that ΓP(θL) = yL and
ΓP(θH) = yH for some open P ⊂ [0, 1]. Fix (yL, yH) ∈ Y. We first consider a constrained
problem (9) subject to the two additional constraints that ΓP(θL) = yL and ΓP(θH) = yH.
P∗ ∈ arg max
P
ˆ 1
0
u′′∗ (θ)ΓP(θ)dθ
subject to P is an open subset of [0, 1],
ΓP(θL) = yL and ΓP(θH) = yH.
(35)
Define (Figure 8)
θL∗ = min{θ ∈ [θL, 1] : Γ[0,θ)(θL) = yL},
θH∗ = max{θ ∈ [0, θH] : Γ(θ,1](θH) = yH}.
Claim 3. If θL∗ ≤ θH∗ , then P∗ = [0, θL∗ ) ∪ (θH∗ , 1] uniquely solves (35).
Proof. By Lemma 4, for any open P ⊂ [0, 1] such that ΓP(θL) = yL and ΓP(θH) = yH, we
have ΓP(θ) is convex in θ and Γ[0,1](θ) ≤ ΓP(θ) ≤ Γ∅(θ) for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. It is easy to
verify (Figure 8) that for any such ΓP, we have ΓP∗(θ) ≤ ΓP(θ) for θ ∈ [0, θL) ∪ (θH, 1] and
ΓP∗(θ) ≥ ΓP(θ) for θ ∈ (θL, θH). Moreover, at least one of the two inequalities is strict for
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Figure 9: Optimal pooling set P∗ given θL∗ > θH∗
an open interval of θ if P 6= P∗. Since u′′∗ (θ) < 0 for θ ∈ [0, θL) ∪ (θH, 1] and u′′∗ (θ) > 0 for
θ ∈ (θL, θH), the set P∗ uniquely solves (35).
Define (Figure 9a)
θL∗∗ = min{θ ∈ [0, 1] : Γ(θ,1](θL) = yL},
θH∗∗ = max{θ ∈ [0, 1] : Γ[0,θ)(θH) = yH}.
(36)
Note that θL∗∗ ≤ θL < θH ≤ θH∗∗.
Claim 4. Suppose θL∗ > θH∗ .
1. If Γ(θL∗∗,1](θ
H) = yH, then P∗ = [0, θL∗∗) ∪ (θL∗∗, 1] uniquely solves (35).
2. If Γ[0,θH∗∗)(θ
L) = yL, then P∗ = [0, θH∗∗) ∪ (θH∗∗, 1] uniquely solves (35).
3. Otherwise, P∗ = [0, θL∗∗) ∪ (θL∗∗, θH∗∗) ∪ (θH∗∗, 1] uniquely solves (35).
Proof. The proof of parts 1 and 2 is analogous to the proof of Claim 3 (Figure 9b).
We now outline the proof of part 3, omitting tedious details. The reader may refer to
Figure 9a for guidance. If θL∗ > θH∗ with (yL, yH) ∈ Y, then
yL +
yH − yL
θH − θL (θ − θL) < Γ∅(θ) for θ ∈ [θ
L, θH]. (37)
Taking into account (37), if Γ(θL∗∗,1](θ
H) 6= yH and Γ[0,θH∗∗)(θL) 6= yL with (yL, yH) ∈ Y, then
θL∗∗ ∈ [0, θL) and θH∗∗ ∈ (θH, 1]. We can then show, using the definitions of GP and ΓP,
that ΓP(θL) = yL and ΓP(θH) = yH with (yL, yH) ∈ Y if and only if (θL∗∗, θH∗∗) is a disjoint
interval in P. By Lemma 4, for any such P, we have ΓP∗(θ) = ΓP(θ) for θ ∈ [θL∗∗, θH∗∗] and
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Figure 10: Optimal pooling set P∗ = [0, θL? ) ∪ (θL? , θH? ) ∪ (θH? , 1]
ΓP∗(θ) ≤ ΓP(θ) for θ ∈ [0, θL∗∗) ∪ (θH∗∗, 1]. Moreover, the inequality is strict for an open
interval of θ if P 6= P∗. Since u′′∗ (θ) < 0 for θ ∈ [0, θL∗∗) ∪ (θH∗∗, 1] ⊂ [0, θL) ∪ (θH, 1], the set P∗
uniquely solves (35).
We now consider the original problem (9), without the constraints that ΓP(θL) = yL and
ΓP(θH) = yH.
Claim 5. If P∗ = [0, θL? ) ∪ (θL? , θH? ) ∪ (θH? , 1] with θL? < θH? < 1 solves (9), then mM? < θL and
mH? > θH, where mM? = E[θ|(θL? , θH? )] and mH? = E[θ|(θH? , 1]].
Proof. To prove this claim, we eliminate one by one the cases (i) mM? ≥ θL and mH? ≥ θH, (ii)
mM? ≤ θL and mH? ≤ θH, and (iii) mM? > θL and mH? > θH.
First, suppose for contradiction that mM? ≥ θL and mH? ≥ θH. The expected payoff under
P∗ is
v∗ =
ˆ 1
0
u∗(θ)dGP∗(θ) = u∗(m
L
?)F(θ
L
? ) + u∗(mM? )(F(θH? )− F(θL? )) + u∗(mH? )(1− F(θH? )),
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where mL? = E[θ|(0, θL? )]. Since θH? is interior, it satisfies the following first-order condition.
Taking into account that
dmM?
dθH?
=
f (θH? )
F(θH? )− F(θL? )
(θH? −mM? ) and
dmH?
dθH?
=
f (θH? )
1− F(θH? )
(mH? − θH? ),
we have
dv∗
dθH?
= f (θH? )
(
u∗(mM? ) + u′∗(mM? )(θH? −mM? )− u∗(mH? )− u′∗(mH? )(θH? −mH? )
)
= 0,
which can be rewritten as
u∗(mM? ) + u′∗(mM? )(θH? −mM? ) = u∗(mH? ) + u′∗(mH? )(θH? −mH? ). (38)
Combining (38) with the fact that u∗ is either strictly concave on (mM? , 1] or strictly convex
on (mM? , θH) and strictly concave on (θH, 1], we can show (Figure 10) that
u∗(θ) >
mH? − θ
mH? −mM?
u∗(mM? ) +
θ −mM?
mH? −mM?
u∗(mH? ) for θ ∈ (mM? , mH? ),
which, given E[θ|(θL? , 1]] ∈ (mM? , mH? ), implies that
ˆ 1
0
u∗(θ)dG[0,θL? )∪(θL? ,1](θ) = u∗(m
L)F(θL? ) + u∗(E[θ|(θL? , 1]])(1− F(θL? ))
> u∗(mL)F(θL? ) + u∗(mM? )(F(θH? )− F(θL? )) + u∗(mH? )(1− F(θH? ))
=
ˆ 1
0
u∗(θ)dG[0,θL? )∪(θL? ,θH? )∪(θH? ,1](θ).
This leads to the desired contradiction. A symmetric argument eliminates the case mM? ≤ θL
and mH? ≤ θH.
Finally, suppose for contradiction that mM? > θL and mH? > θH. In the subcase θL? ≥
θL, so that u′′∗ (θ) > 0 for θ ∈ (θL? , θH? ), let P = [0, θL? ) ∪ (θH? , 1]. Then ΓP(θ) > ΓP∗(θ) on
the interval (θL? , θH? ) and ΓP(θ) = ΓP∗(θ) everywhere else; so P∗ cannot be optimal. In the
subcase θL? < θL, so that u∗ is strictly concave on (θL? , θL) and strictly convex on (θL, θH? ),
an application of Proposition 4 to the interval (θL? , θH? ) implies, for some θM? ∈ (θL, θH? ), that
the pooling set (θL? , θM? ) uniquely solves (9) on the interval (θL? , θH? ). Thus, P = [0, θL? ) ∪
(θL? , θM? ) ∪ (θH? , 1] produces a strictly higher expected payoff than P∗. Both subcases thus
lead to contradiction.
Claim 6. If P∗ = [0, θL∗∗) ∪ (θL∗∗, θH∗∗) ∪ (θH∗∗, 1] solves (9), and if (36) holds with yL = ΓP∗(θL) and
yH = ΓP∗(θ
H), then θL∗∗ = 0 and θH∗∗ = 1.
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Proof. Suppose for contradiction that θH∗∗ < 1. Define mM∗∗ = E[θ|(θL∗∗, θH∗∗)] and mH∗∗ =
E[θ|(θH∗∗, 1]]. Then θH ≤ θH∗∗ < mH∗∗ < 1. It is also easy to verify (Figure 10) that mM∗∗ ∈ [θL, θH]
by definition of θL∗∗ and θH∗∗ and given that θH∗∗ < 1. But this contradicts Claim 5; thus θH∗∗ = 1.
A symmetric argument shows that θL∗∗ = 0.
Combining Claims 3 – 6, we conclude that P∗ takes one of three forms: [0, θL∗ ) ∪ (θH∗ , 1]
with θL < θL∗ < θH∗ < θH, or [0, θM∗ ) ∪ (θM∗ , 1] with θM∗ ∈ (0, 1), or [0, 1].
By Proposition 3 of Kolotilin (2018), P = [0, θL∗ ) ∪ (θH∗ , 1] with θL < θL∗ < θH∗ < θH is
optimal if and only if the first-order conditions (13) and (14) hold. Also, if (13) and (14) hold,
then mL∗ < θL and mH∗ > θH because u∗ is convex on (θL, θH); so part 1 of the proposition
follows. If such θL∗ and θH∗ do not exist, then P∗ takes one of the two remaining forms: either
[0, 1] or [0, θM∗ ) ∪ (θM∗ , 1] with θM∗ ∈ (0, 1). Clearly, P = [0, 1] is not optimal if and only if (16)
holds for some θM∗ ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, P = [0, θM∗ ) ∪ (θM∗ , 1] is optimal only if the first-order
condition (15) holds. Finally, if P = [0, θM∗ ) ∪ (θM∗ , 1] is optimal, then mL∗ < θL and mH∗ > θH
by Claim 5. So, parts 2 and 3 of the proposition follow.
Appendix D Quadratic Payoffs
Lemma 6. Under Assumption 3,
1. u∗(θ) is continuously differentiable in θ for all θ ∈ [0, 1];
2. u∗(θ) is twice continuously differentiable in θ for almost all θ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Since
ρ∗(θ) =

ρR(θ) + `, if ρFB(θ)− ρR(θ) > `,
ρFB(θ), if |ρFB(θ)− ρR(θ)| ≤ `,
ρR(θ)− `, if ρFB(θ)− ρR(θ) < −`,
we have
ρ′∗(θ) =
ρ′R(θ), if |ρFB(θ)− ρR(θ)| > `,ρ′FB(θ), if |ρFB(θ)− ρR(θ)| < `. (39)
Further, u∗(θ) is continuously differentiable in θ for all θ ∈ [0, 1], with
u′∗(θ) =
ρ′FB(θ)ρ∗(θ) + (ρFB(θ)− ρ∗(θ))ρ′∗(θ), if |ρFB(θ)− ρR(θ)| 6= `,ρ′FB(θ)ρ∗(θ), if |ρFB(θ)− ρR(θ)| = `.
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Finally, since ρ∗(θ) is twice continuously differentiable in θ everywhere except at most two
states where |ρFB(θ)− ρR(θ)| = `, it follows that u∗(θ) is twice continuously differentiable
everywhere except at most these two states, with
u′′∗ (θ) = (2ρ′FB(θ)− ρ′∗(θ))ρ′∗(θ) if |ρFB(θ)− ρR(θ)| 6= `. (40)
Proof of Corollary 2. From (39) and (40), u′′∗ (θ) < 0 for some θ ∈ [0, 1] if and only if |ρFB(θ)−
ρR(θ)| > ` and ρ′R(θ) > 2ρ′FB(θ). In this case, u′′∗ (θ) < 0 in some open interval, because
u′′∗ (θ) is continuous in θ almost everywhere. Lemma 5 completes the proof.
Lemma 7. If the receiver is highly responsive, ` is strictly increasing in δ.
Proof. If δ = 0, then u′′∗ (θ) < 0 for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. By Lemmas 2 and 4, the expected joint
payoff is strictly higher under P = [0, 1] than under P = ∅. Thus, Lemma 3 implies that
v− vS − vR > 0 and ` is strictly increasing in δ for all δ ∈ [0, 1).
Proof of Proposition 6. By Lemma 5, P∗ = ∅ if δ ∈ (δA, 1), and P∗ = [0, 1] if δ ∈ (0, δB). By
Proposition 4, P∗ = [0, θL∗ ) for some θL∗ ∈ (θL, 1] if δ ∈ (δB, δA).
Differentiating (34) with respect to ` yields
d2v∗
d`dθL∗
= f (θL∗ )
(
du′∗(mL∗)
d`
(θL∗ −mL∗) +
du∗(mL∗)
d`
)
= f (θL∗ )
(
(ρ′FB(m
L∗)− ρ′∗(mL∗))(θL∗ −mL∗) + (ρFB(mL∗)− ρ∗(mL∗))
)
< f (θL∗ )
(
(ρ′FB(m
L∗)− ρ′∗(mL∗))(θL −mL∗) + (ρFB(mL∗)− ρ∗(mL∗))
)
= 0,
where the inequality holds because θL∗ > θL and ρ′FB(m
L∗) < ρ′∗(mL∗), and the last equality
holds because ρFB(θL) = ρ∗(θL) and ρFB(θ) − ρ∗(θ) is linear in θ for θ ∈ (0, θL). So θL∗ is
nonincreasing in `, and dθL∗/d` < 0 if θL∗ < 1, as follows, for example, from Theorem 1
of Edlin and Shannon (1998). Further, at δ = δB, we have θL = 1 and (34) implies that
dv∗/dθL∗
∣∣
θL∗=1
> 0. Therefore, θL∗ reaches 1 at δB∗ > δB.
Corollary 3. Suppose the receiver is highly responsive, and X = [0, θL) for some θL ∈ (0, 1).
Keeping θL, `, and ρFB constant, θL∗ is strictly increasing in a = ρ′R(θ) if θ
L∗ < 1. Moreover,
θL∗ → θL as a→ 2.
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Proof. Notice that ρR(θ) + ` = a(θ − θL) + ρFB(θL) for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. By the same argument
as in the proof of Proposition 6, we have dθL∗/da > 0 if θL∗ < 1 because
d2v∗
dadθL∗
= f (θL∗ )
(
du′∗(mL∗)
da
(θL∗ −mL∗) +
du∗(mL∗)
da
− du∗(θ
L∗ )
da
)
= f (θL∗ )
(
2(a− 1)(θL −mL∗)(θL∗ −mL∗)− (a− 1)(θL −mL∗)2
)
= f (θL∗ )(a− 1)(θL −mL∗)
(
2θL∗ − θL −mL∗
)
> 0,
where the inequality holds because θL∗ > θL > mL∗ . Finally, if a → 2, then u′′∗ (θ) → 0 for
θ ∈ (0, θL) and thus dv∗/dθL∗
∣∣
θL∗=θL
→ 0 by (34), implying that θL∗ → θL.
Proof of Proposition 7. By Lemma 5, P∗ = ∅ if δ ∈ (δA, 1). By Proposition 4, P∗ = [0, θL∗ ) for
some θL∗ ∈ (θL, 1] if δ ∈ (δB, δA). Further, by Proposition 6, dθL∗/dδ < 0 if θL∗ < 1. If θL∗
reaches 1 at δB∗ > δB, then P∗ = [0, 1] remains optimal for δ ∈ [0, δB∗ ) as follows from the
following claim.
Claim 7. If P∗ = [0, 1] solves (9) at δ ∈ (0, 1), then Pˆ∗ = [0, 1] solves (9) at δˆ ∈ [0, δ).
Proof. Using (9), (39), and (40), we obtain that, for any open set P ⊂ [0, 1],
−
ˆ
θ∈Xˆ
(ρ′R(θ)− 2ρ′FB(θ))(ΓP(θ)− Γ[0,1](θ))dθ +
ˆ
θ/∈Xˆ
(ρ′FB(θ))
2(ΓP(θ)− Γ[0,1](θ))dθ
≤−
ˆ
θ∈X
(ρ′R(θ)− 2ρ′FB(θ))(ΓP(θ)− Γ[0,1](θ))dθ +
ˆ
θ/∈X
(ρ′FB(θ))
2(ΓP(θ)− Γ[0,1](θ))dθ ≤ 0,
where the first inequality holds because a = ρ′R(θ) > 2ρ
′
FB(θ) = 2 for an highly responsive
receiver, ΓP(θ) ≥ Γ[0,1](θ) for all θ ∈ [0, 1], and X ⊂ Xˆ for δ > δˆ, and the second inequality
holds because P∗ = [0, 1] solves (9) at δ.
Suppose now that θL∗ < 1 at δ = δB. For δ < δB, the set X consists of two disjoint
intervals [0, θL) and (θH, 1]. At δ = δB, we have that θL∗ < 1 satisfies (13) and θH∗ = θH = 1
satisfies (14). By continuity, there exist θL∗ < θH∗ that satisfy (13) and (14) for δ in some left
neighbourhood (δC∗ , δB) of δB; so, by Proposition 5, P∗ = [0, θL∗ ) ∪ (θH∗ , 1] with θL∗ < θH∗ is
optimal for δ ∈ (δC∗ , δB). Moreover, by the same argument as in the proof of Propostion 6,
dθL∗/dδ < 0 and dθH∗ /dδ > 0 if θL∗ < θH∗ . Thus, at δ = δC∗ , the optimal thresholds θL∗ and θH∗
coincide. Notice that δC∗ > 0, because at δ = 0 the left hand sides of (13) and (14) evaluated at
θL∗ = θH∗ = θ0 are strictly higher than the right hand sides of (13) and (14), by strict concavity
of u∗(θ) in θ on X = [0, θ0) ∪ (θ0, 1].
For δ < δC∗ , there do not exist thresholds θL∗ < θH∗ that satisfy (13) and (14); so, by Propo-
sition 5, P∗ is either [0, 1] or [0, θ∗M) ∪ (θ∗M, 1]. By Claim 7, there exists δD∗ ∈ [0, δC∗ ] such that
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P∗ = [0, θ∗M) ∪ (θ∗M, 1] for δ ∈ (δD∗ , δC∗ ) and P∗ = [0, 1] for δ ∈ (0, δD∗ ). It remains to show
that δD∗ ∈ (0, δC∗ ). Notice that δD∗ < δC∗ , because at δ = δC∗ , the set P∗ = [0, θL∗ ) ∪ (θH∗ , 1]
with θL∗ = θH∗ , which satisfy (13) and (14), yields a strictly higher expected joint payoff than
P = [0, 1], as follows from
ˆ 1
0
u∗(θ)dG[0,θL∗ )∪(θH∗ ,1](θ) = u∗(m
L∗)F(θL∗ ) + u∗(mH∗ )(1− F(θH∗ ))
> u∗(E[θ]) =
ˆ 1
0
u∗(θ)dG[0,1](θ),
where the inequality follows from E[θ] ∈ (mL∗ , mH∗ ), (13) and (14).
It remains to show that δD∗ > 0. By Proposition 5, if [0, θ∗M) ∪ (θ∗M, 1] with θM∗ ∈ (0, 1) is
optimal at δ, then θM∗ satisfies (15). It is easy to see that there is no solution θM∗ to (15) such
that θM∗ → 0 or θM∗ → 1 as δ → 0, because u′∗(0) and u′∗(1) are finite and u∗(θ) is strictly
concave in θ on [0, 1] at δ = 0. Moreover, by Lemmas 2 and 4, P∗ = [0, 1] uniquely solves (9)
at δ = 0. It follows by continuity that δD∗ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 8. In the case ` > `A∗ , there are no extreme states; so, by Corollary 2, the
optimal pooling set P∗ is empty. Thus, this case holds.
In the case ` ∈ (`B∗ , `A∗ ), there are low extreme states (θL > 0) but there are no high
extreme states. It is straightforward to show that (11) of Proposition 4 is equivalent to θL∗ =
γ(−`− b). Further, we can show that θL∗ is decreasing in `, and (given our assumption that
b > 14
√
(a− 2)a− (a− 1)) that θL∗ < 1 when ` = `B∗ . Thus, this case holds.
In the case ` < `B∗ , there are low and high extreme states (0 < θL < θH < 1). It is
straightforward to show that (13) and (14) of Proposition 5 are respectively equivalent to
θL∗ = γ(−`− b) and θH∗ = 1− γ(`+ 1− a− b). The conditions from part 1 of Proposition 5
are satisfied if θL∗ < θH∗ , which is equivalent to ` > `C∗ . Thus, the case ` ∈ (`C∗ , `B∗ ) holds.
Now, consider the case ` ≤ `C∗ . By Proposition 7 and Lemma 7, there exists `D∗ ∈ (0, `C∗ )
such that P∗ = [0, 1] if ` ∈ [0, `D∗ ) and P∗ = [0, θM∗ ) ∪ (θM∗ , 1] for some θM∗ ∈ (0, 1) if
` ∈ (`D∗ , `C∗ ). If P∗ = [0, θM∗ ) ∪ (θM∗ , 1], then Proposition 5 implies that θM∗ /2 ∈ (0, θL) and
(θM∗ + 1)/2 ∈ (θH, 1), and thus that the expected joint payoff under such P∗ is
ˆ θM∗
0
u∗
(
a θ
M∗
2 + b + `, θ
)
dθ +
ˆ 1
θM∗
u∗
(
a θ
M∗ +1
2 + b− `, θ
)
dθ.
Maximization of this expression yields
θM∗ =
(a− 2)a + 16b`
2 ((a− 2)a + 8`(1− a)) .
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Further, at the threshold ` = `D∗ , the pooling sets [0, θM∗ ) ∪ (θM∗ , 1] and [0, 1] yield equal joint
expected payoffs:
ˆ θM∗
0
u∗
(
θM∗
2 + `
D∗ , θ
)
dθ +
ˆ 1
θM∗
u∗
(
θM∗ +1
2 − `D∗ , θ
)
dθ =
ˆ 1
0
u∗
(
ρ∗
(
1
2
)
, θ
)
dθ,
with θM∗ =
(a− 2)a + 16b`
2 ((a− 2)a + 8`(1− a)) and ρ∗
(
1
2
)
= min
{
a
2 + b + `
D∗ , 12
}
.
(41)
Given a > 2 and b > 14
√
(a− 2)a− (a− 1), we can calculate using (41) that
`D∗ =
(a− 2)/4 if 3a/4+ b > 1,(a−2)a
16(a+b−1) if 3a/4+ b < 1.
The cases ` ∈ (`D∗ , `C∗ ) and ` ∈ [0, `D∗ ) follow immediately.
For completeness, we also state the optimal pooling set for values of a and b where sep-
aration in the middle with pooling on both sides never occurs.
Proposition 8’. Suppose a > 2, a/2+ b < 1/2, and b > 14
√
(a− 2)a− (a− 1). Then the optimal
pooling set is
P∗ =

∅, if ` ∈ (`A∗ ,∞)
[0, θL∗ ) where θL∗ = γ(−`− b), if ` ∈ (`B∗ , `A∗ ),
[0, 1], if ` ∈ [0, `B∗ ).
and where
γ =
2
(
2(a− 1) +√a(a− 2))
3(a− 1)2 + 1 and `
A∗ = −b and `B∗ =
√
(a− 2)a
2
+ (a− 1)− b.
Proof. The cases ` ∈ (`A∗ ,∞) and ` ∈ (`B∗ , `A∗ ) follow a similar argument to that of the corre-
sponding cases from Proposition 8. At ` = `B∗ , it is straightforward to calculate that θL∗ = 1,
and that there are low extreme states but there are no high extreme states. Thus, by Proposi-
tion 7 and Lemma 7, P∗ = [0, 1] for all ` < `B∗ .
Two cases of the uniform-distribution setting are not covered by Propositions 8 and 8’.
First, if the receiver is not highly responsive, a < 2, then complete pooling is optimal by
Corollary 2. Second, if the receiver is upwardly-biased (on average), a/2+ b > 1/2, then the
solution is symmetric to that of the downwardly-biased (on average) receiver. Specifically,
if the optimal pooling set is P∗ for parameter values (a, b), then the optimal pooling set is
Pˆ∗ = {θ : 1− θ ∈ Pˆ∗} for parameter values (aˆ, bˆ) = (a, 1− a− b).
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Proof of Proposition 9. Define θ? = sup mp and θ? = inf mp, where mp solves (8). We first
show by contradiction in each case that if θ? < 1, then ρ(mp) = mp − ` and all states θ > θ?
are separated by µ. Suppose that ρ(mp) ∈ (mp − `, θ? − `]. If some states above θ? are
pooled, say (θ1, θ2), we can decrease the value of (8) by separating these states, as follows
from ˆ θ
θ1
(
θ1 + θ2
2
− `
)
dθ˜ >
ˆ θ
θ1
(
θ˜ − `) dθ˜ for θ ∈ (θ1, θ2).
If all states above θ? are separated, we can decrease the value of (8) by pooling states (θ?, θ?+
ε) and mp, and inducing the same decision ρ(mp), leading to a contradiction. Next suppose
that ρ(mp) > θ?− `. Then some states adjacent to θ? from above, say (θ?, θˆ), must be pooled,
such that ρ(mp) <
(
θ? + θˆ
)
/2− `. But then we can decrease the value of (8) by separating
states (θˆ − ε, θˆ), as follows from
ˆ θ
θ?
(
θ? + θˆ
2
− `
)
dθ˜ >
ˆ θ
θ?
(
θ? + θˆ − ε
2
− `
)
dθ˜ for θ ∈ (θ?, θˆ − ε),
ˆ θ
θ?
(
θ? + θˆ
2
− `
)
dθ˜ >
ˆ θˆ−ε
θ?
(
θ? + θˆ − ε
2
− `
)
dθ˜ +
ˆ θ
θˆ−ε
(
θ˜ − `) dθ˜ for θ ∈ (θˆ − ε, θˆ).
Analogously, we can show that if θ? > 0, then ρ(mp) = mp + ` and all states θ < θ? are
separated by µ. This implies that either θ? = 0 or θ? = 1.
Thus, the sender’s worst equilibrium payoff vS is achieved either by pooling set [0, θ
L)
and decision rule ρ(m) = m− `, or by pooling set (θH, 1] and decision rule ρ(m) = m + `.
Computation reveals that the value of (8) under [0, θ) and ρ(m) = m− ` is smaller than the
value of (8) under (1− θ, 1] and ρ(m) = m + ` for all θ ∈ [0, 1] if a/2 + b > 1/2. Moreover,
the value of (8) is minimized for θ ∈ [0, 1] at either θ = 0 or
θ =
a
(
(1− c) +
√
(1− c)2 − 81−aca2 (−bc− (1− c)(b− `))
)
2α
< 1,
where the inequality follows from the assumption a/2+ b > 1/2. Further computation then
produces θL, as defined in Proposition 9.
The case a/2 + b > 1/2, which is not covered by Proposition 9, follows a symmetric
argument. In this case, the sender’s worst equilibrium payoff is achieved by the decision
rule ρ(m) = m + ` and some pooling set
(
θH, 1
]
.
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Appendix E Transparency
Proof of Proposition 10. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that L(v), as defined in Section
3.1, takes the same value under ψ and ψˆ. We will show that the best equilibrium joint payoff
is higher and the worst monotone equilibrium payoffs are smaller under ψˆ than under ψ.
Specifically, vˆ ≥ v, vˆR < vR, and vˆS ≤ vS. Clearly, Lˆ(vˆ) ≥ L(v), with strict inequality if
δ > 0. The proposition follows easily from this observation.
The best equilibrium joint payoff v under ψ can be supported by an equilibrium in single-
period punishment strategies such that ρ∗(µ∗(θ)) is induced in each period on the equilib-
rium path, by application of Proposition 3 to each realization of signal ψ. Since ρ∗(µ∗(θ))
is nondecreasing in θ on [0, 1], it can be supported in an equilibrium, without money burn-
ing, under less informative signal ψˆ by application of an analogue of Proposition 1 to each
realization of signal ψ; so, vˆ ≥ v.
By Proposition 3, the receiver’s worst equilibrium payoffs under ψˆ and ψ are
vˆR = E[uR(ρR(ψˆ(θ)), θ)] < E[uR(ρR(ψ(θ)), θ)] = vR,
where the inequality holds because ψ is strictly more informative than ψˆ.
By a similar argument to the proof of Proposition 3, the sender’s worst equilibrium pay-
off under ψ can be supported by τS = 0, TS (m) = 0, and vS (m) = vS; that is, the sender may
refuse to make any ex-ante or ex-post transfers, and the worst punishment for him would in-
volve zero transfers from the receiver and the worst continuation value. Let µ (θ) and ρ (m)
be penal message and decision rules that support this equilibrium. By assumption ρ(µ(θ))
is nondecreasing in θ. Then the interim transfer tS(µ(θ)) is defined by (3) and (4) given that
the set of states is ψ(θ) ⊂ [0, 1] rather than [0, 1]:
tS(m) = h(m)− min
m∈µ(ψ(θ))
h(m),
h(m) = uS(ρ(m), θ(m))−
ˆ θ(m)
0
∂uS
∂θ
(ρ(µ(θ˜)), θ˜)dθ˜,
(42)
where θ(m) ∈ m. The message and decision rules µ(θ) and ρ(m) such that ρ(µ(θ)) is nonde-
creasing in θ can be supported in equilibrium under ψˆ using the interim transfer rule tˆS(m)
that differs from tS(m) given by (42) only in that the minimum of h is taken over m ∈ µ(ψˆ(θ))
rather than over m ∈ µ(ψ(θ)). Since ψ(θ) ⊂ ψˆ(θ) for all θ ∈ [0, 1] by the definition of more
informative signals, we have tˆS(µ(θ)) ≥ tS(µ(θ)) for all θ ∈ [0, 1], and thus
vˆS ≤ E[uS(ρ(µ(θ)), θ)− tˆS(µ(θ))] ≤ E[uS(ρ(µ(θ)), θ)− tS(µ(θ))] = vS.
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